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American criminal law punishes private consensual sex between
adults.  Someone unacquainted with American sex crime law, and in
the habit of keenly protecting his or her sexual privacy and autonomy,
might find that initial observation outrageous.  The observation
becomes less outrageous, however, when we qualify it by saying that the
criminal law punishes some forms of private consensual sex between
adults.  Still, the observation bears scrutiny, for one might imagine that
it must be a difficult proposition—given the nuance and complexity of
sexual relationships generally—when the state must select which forms
of private consensual sexual conduct between adults it will subject to
moral condemnation and punishment.
The nuance and complexity of sexual matters notwithstanding, the
criminal law has long sought to regulate them, even far beyond the
obvious categories of criminalization, such as rape.1  Criminal law regu-
lates both the manner in which we obtain sex (for example, by force
and without consent, or by payment of money) and also with whom we
may have sex, or the category of person with whom we may have sex (for
example, siblings, students, patients, or persons married to someone
else).  This remains true even where the sex is, in fact, consensual (even
affirmatively desired) and entirely private between consenting adult
parties.2  Of course, one axiom guiding such criminalization is that the
sexual appetite of human beings—like other human appetites—ought
to be controlled and that the state can advance important interests
through such controls.  Yet in a free society devoted to some substantial
measure of legal protection for sexual autonomy, the criminalization of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy.  I presented an earlier
version of this paper at the second annual Loyola University Chicago Constitutional Law
Colloquium and appreciate the feedback I received upon that presentation.  I also am
grateful to Dale Carpenter, Kelly Strader, Pamela Wilkins, Pamela Lysaght, Bret Boyce,
and Bob Brown for their helpful comments, and to Stacy Johnson, and Conor Fitzpatrick
for their fantastic research and editorial assistance.  Finally, I am grateful to Rachael
Soren for both her research and editorial assistance, as well as her many valuable com-
ments during the drafting of this piece.
1. See LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 215–22
(1993); Steven R. Morrison, Creating Sex Offender Registries: The Religious Right and the Fail-
ure to Protect Society’s Vulnerable, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 23, 74 (2007). See also Jane E. Larsen,
“Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of
Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 414 (1993) (stating “[r]egulating human relationships is
among the most difficult of legal tasks.”).
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private consensual sex between adults raises serious concerns, both as a
matter of sound public policy and of constitutional law.
The constitutional dilemma here is one created chiefly by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,3 which invalidated a
Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy.  It is an exceedingly
rich case but a challenge to interpret and apply. Lawrence appears to
hold that private, consensual, non-prostitution sex between adults
enjoys constitutional protection under the doctrine of substantive due
process.4  Yet the extent of that protection remains fuzzy.  The Court
speaks of the right broadly, in terms that make the right appear funda-
mental, and thus presumably subject to more searching judicial scru-
tiny: “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.  The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more
transcendent dimensions”;5 “It suffices for us to acknowledge that
adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons”;6 “These references [to laws and traditions of the last fifty
years] show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protec-
tion to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex.”7
But the Court ultimately disposed of the case by saying that Texas
possessed no legitimate interest (i.e., no rational basis) for the law.8
This has led many courts to find—without more direction from the
Court—that whatever right that Lawrence vindicated was not fundamen-
tal.  Thus, legislation implicating such a right is subjected only to
rational basis review (note that the academic commentary subjects this
conclusion to intense criticism),9 though presumably the state’s interest
must be something other than a mere effort to recognize and enforce
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  The Court’s description of the facts that led to Lawrence’s
prosecution pursuant to the Texas homosexual sodomy prohibition, we now know, did
not fully capture the story behind the case.  Fortunately, Dale Carpenter’s excellent
recent book has helped us to better understand the story of Lawrence. See DALE CARPEN-
TER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF Lawrence v. Texas (2012).
4. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
5. Id. at 562.
6. Id. at 567.
7. Id. at 572.
8. Id. at 578.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2004); Reliable Con-
sultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 n.32 (5th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of
Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771
(10th Cir. 2008). But see Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Law-
rence v. Texas, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 35–36 (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that Lawrence essen-
tially disposed of the “fundamental rights” nomenclature and instead holds that state
interference with “liberty” is presumptively unconstitutional); Laurence H. Tribe, Law-
rence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1893, 1898 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence recognized a right that should be treated as
fundamental); Nancy C. Marcus, Note, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy
Comes Out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355, 387-89 (2006) (arguing that Law-
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good morals among the citizenry.10  The Court did not apply (indeed,
did not mention) the substantive due process approach articulated
most fully in Washington v. Glucksberg, which ordinarily requires, on sub-
stantive due process claims for rights not yet recognized, a careful
description of the asserted right and that the right be vindicated by
history and tradition.11
An additional and important consideration in understanding the
scope of Lawrence is that Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court con-
cluded with what I will call the “Exclusions Paragraph,” which lists the
kinds of conduct that would be excluded from the Lawrence Court’s pro-
tection and is thus presumably still subject to criminal prohibition.12
Indeed, many courts have read the Lawrence Court’s Exclusions Para-
graph as absolute.13  In it, Justice Kennedy explains that the case does
not involve minors, so sex crimes involving minors are excluded from
Lawrence’s protection.14  It does not involve “public conduct or prostitu-
tion.”15  Homosexual marriage is not at issue.16  And finally, and most
importantly for present purposes, Justice Kennedy says the case does
not involve “persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situ-
ated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.”17
Again, the Court is vague as to the universe of actors that this phrase
contemplates.  It might refer to those who cannot easily refuse consent
Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 946 (2004) (suggesting that a reex-
amination of tiered scrutiny may be necessary in light of, among others, Lawrence).
10. This was the interest advanced by Texas, which the Court found insufficient.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (adopting Justice Stevens’ statement dissenting in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986), that the state’s view of a sexual practice as immoral “is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”).  For analysis of this
aspect of Lawrence, see Keith Burgess-Jackson, Our Millian Constitution: The Supreme Court’s
Repudiation of Immorality as a Ground of Criminal Punishment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 407 (2004).
11. 521 U.S. 702, 720–23 (1997).  Dale Carpenter thinks it significant that the
Court did not mention Glucksberg, but argues that Lawrence and Glucksberg are nonetheless
compatible.  Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1163–65
(2004).
12. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
13. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding Lawrence
does not protect consensual adult incest); United States v. Palfrey, 499 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41
(D.D.C. 2007) (holding Lawrence categorically does not protect prostitution); State v. Frei-
tag, 130 P.3d 544, 545–46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (same); State v. Van, 688 N.W.2d 600, 614
(Neb. 2004) (holding Lawrence does not protect consensual sexual conduct involving
bondage and sadomasochism because such conduct involves injury to the person). But see,
e.g., State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24, 28 (Kan. 2005) (invalidating Kansas “Romeo and
Juliet statute” on equal protection grounds, even though the case involved sex between an
adult and a minor); Earle, 517 F.3d at 740, 746–47 (invalidating state ban on sale of sexual
devices, even though this arguably involves commercial sexual activity, like prostitution).
14. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
15. Id. While it might be argued that this portion of the Exclusions Paragraph can
be read as not protecting any “commercial” sexual conduct, I am uncomfortable reading
the language quite that broadly. See Earle, 517 F.3d at 740, 746–47 (invalidating state ban
on sale of sexual devices, pursuant to Lawrence).  I therefore use the admittedly unwieldy
phrase “non—prostitution,” to indicate that prostitution is not protected by Lawrence,
even if other sexual conduct with a commercial element may be.
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because they fear harmful consequences of nonconsent based on some
objective fact.  For example, a woman only has sex with her boyfriend
because he has been sexually violent in the past and she fears he might
become violent if she refuses; or a woman who receives a sexual pro-
position from her boss but has sex with him only because he tells her
that she will be fired if she does not do so.  Or it might refer to any
relationship, regardless of consent given, involving some disparity in
power or authority—even if that power or authority is not exerted and,
indeed, even if the victim does not reasonably believe that such power
or authority would be exerted—because the nature of the relationship
creates at least some risk that the power disparity has induced the con-
sent, which might not exist but for the power disparity.
Shortly after the Court decided Lawrence, a rich body of scholarship
emerged debating the case’s meaning.  For instance, in an important
early piece, Randy Barnett analyzed what he saw as a major departure
by Justice Kennedy from settled due process doctrine.18 Barnett sees
Justice Kennedy’s approach as a potentially revolutionary one, if Justice
Kennedy is serious about a new approach—an expansion of liberty,
rather than privacy—based on his repeated references to “liberty” in the
case.19  In response, Dale Carpenter rejected the notion of Lawrence as a
libertarian opinion.20  Carpenter emphasizes the many ways in which
Justice Kennedy’s opinion goes out of its way to limit the holding.21  As
such, Carpenter argues that the best reading of Lawrence actually under-
mines the claims of those like Justice Scalia—whose dissent worried that
the Lawrence opinion would usher in a new era of constitutional law in
which legal restraints on sexuality were broadly invalidated by an activist
and undemocratic judiciary22—and those like Barnett, who actually
hoped for a more libertarian approach than they actually received.23
The early scholarship, though, did not grapple primarily with Law-
rence as a substantive criminal law limitation.  More recently, Kelly
Strader has done just that, articulating a vision of Lawrence as a distinctly
criminal law decision.24  In Strader’s view, Lawrence embraces the crimi-
nal law’s harm principle (drawn, as he views it, essentially from Millian
doctrine) and requires that the criminal law of sex punish only conduct
18. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 21; see also Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy:
A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1582–90 (2005) (responding to Car-
penter’s claims about libertarian aspects of Lawrence).
19. Barnett, supra note 9, at 21.
20. See Carpenter, supra note 11, at 1169.
21. Id. at 1148–69.
22. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590–91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia writes that:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, mastur-
bation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable
only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single
one of these laws is called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no
effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.
Id. at 590.  As I will explain infra, this appears to be a gross overstatement.
23. Carpenter, supra note 11, at 1141.
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that is actually harmful, not merely socially harmful in the abstract.25
Strader also rejects the claim of lower courts that the Exclusions Para-
graph is an absolute bar to relief on any claim involving conduct that
implicates that paragraph.26  Rather, he argues, that paragraph simply
allowed the Court to reserve for another day those cases in which the
conduct might involve some identifiable harm, a problem the Court did
not have to confront in Lawrence because there clearly had been no
showing of harm.27  Accordingly, although most of the academic com-
mentary sees Lawrence as protecting a right to private, non-prostitution,
consensual adult sex, the literature has been widely divergent as to the
nature of the right that Lawrence protects and the kind and degree of
judicial scrutiny to which courts must subject sex crime legislation.
Quite apart from answering our questions about the constitution-
ally permissible scope of sex crime legislation in America, then, Law-
rence—over ten years later, even—instead creates further dilemmas for
the criminal law of consensual sex, where those crimes do not involve
minors, commercial sex, public sex, force or coercion, or other
exploitation contemplated in the Exclusions Paragraph.  These dilem-
mas are reflected in the existing scholarship on Lawrence, including
Lawrence’s significance as to criminal law matters ranging from the use
of sexual devices28 to incest29 and fornication.30  This reflects not mere
academic interest but, perhaps more importantly, a continued frustra-
25. Id. at 66–67.  Strader’s piece is partly a response to those who reject this reading
of Lawrence. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence,
and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1313 (2004)
(arguing that Lawrence did not hold “that the Constitution incorporates the harm princi-
ple”); Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 971 (2010)
(describing difficulties of judicial application of the harm principle).
26. Strader, supra note 24, at 58–60.
27. Id. at 59.
28. See Curtis Waldo, Note, Toys Are Us: Sex Toys, Substantive Due Process, and the Amer-
ican Way, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 807, 809 (2009); Kristin Fasullo, Note, Beyond Law-
rence v. Texas: Crafting a Fundamental Right to Sexual Privacy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 2997
(2009); Nathan R. Curtis, Note, Unraveling Lawrence’s Concerns About Legislated Morality:
The Constitutionality of Laws Criminalizing the Sale of Obscene Devices, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1369,
1370 (2010); Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After
Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2004).
29. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Polit-
ics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99
N.W. U. L. REV. 1543, 1544 (2005); Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 337, 337 (2004).
30. See Amanda Connor, Note, Is Your Bedroom a Private Place? Fornication and Funda-
mental Rights, 39 N.M. L. REV. 507, 507 (2009) (evaluating Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528
F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2008), which held that there is no fundamental federal constitutional
right to engage in consensual sex).
Bestiality, too, is a subject of some debate but I, for one, am less concerned with
bestiality laws as a constitutional matter.  Even on a more libertarian reading of Lawrence, I
am confident that the Court would find the state interests in public health and protection
of animals from abuse to be sufficient for upholding such criminal prohibitions.  On this
score, as on others, I think Justice Scalia’s Lawrence dissent, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 586–605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overstated his objections to the majority opin-






      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 70 Side B      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE104.txt unknown Seq: 6  1-MAY-14 14:39
130 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
tion about the Court’s vagueness and ambivalence concerning a right
that seems so socially vital, if not unlimited.
To wit, the constitutionality of criminal sanctions concerning both
manner-of-sex and category-of-victim range from the fairly easy cases to
the far more difficult.  Crimes punishing the manner of having sex
range from traditional and reformed rape laws, to those that punish
rape obtained by fraud or seduction.  Some variation of the latter prob-
lem is familiar: one person deceives another person in order to have
sex with them.  Those who teach criminal law materials on rape by
fraud may well introduce it with a classic deception/seduction scena-
rio:31 a man, D, looks very much like a famous actor, X. V, a woman,
sees D and approaches him for conversation, believing that D is the
famous actor X.  She indicates this belief to him, and D perpetuates the
falsehood, pretending to be X.  He asks her if she wants to go to his
hotel room, which she does willingly, and they have sex that is, in all
apparent respects, consensual.  Afterward, V realizes that D is not X and
claims that her consent was limited to having sex with X, not D.  Is this
rape, or some other sex crime?  Or, to put it in post-Lawrence terms, can
the state constitutionally criminalize sex obtained by deception, where
the victim was not deceived as to the nature of the act and therefore
knowingly and voluntarily consented to the sex?
Crimes involving consensual sex between categories of persons—
what we might think of as prohibited sexual partners—are equally per-
plexing.  Again, there are the easy and comparatively uncontroversial
examples: a forty-year-old may not legally have sex with a ten-year-old,
for example.  Yet harder problems exist, such as barring a psychothera-
pist from engaging in consensual sexual relations with a patient, even if
the therapeutic relationship between the two has ended.32  Or such as
barring a twenty-three-year-old from having consensual sex with a
nineteen-year-old, if the former is a teacher and the latter is a student at
the teacher’s high school, or a thirty-year-old college professor from
having private consensual sex with a twenty-five-year-old graduate stu-
dent.  Perhaps it is a preposterous notion that the Constitution might
be thought to protect sex between a high school teacher and adult stu-
dent, or between a psychotherapist and patient, without regard to the
fact that the parties in these situations are consenting adults.  But if
viewed at a somewhat broader level of abstraction—that the Constitu-
tion protects some right of consenting adults to engage in private, non-
prostitution sexual conduct, the level of abstraction arguably (if impre-
cisely) adopted in Lawrence—the proposition seems far less preposter-
ous.  It is therefore reasonable to ask whether these are among the
kinds of consensual sexual relationships that Lawrence might protect.33
31. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 582 (6th ed. 2012).
32. See generally State v. Hollenbeck, 53 A.3d 591 (N.H. 2012) (holding Lawrence did
not prevent enforcement of felonious sexual assault statute where a psychotherapist had
consensual sex with former patient within one year of termination of therapeutic
relationship).
33. There is an excellent body of academic literature on the enforcement of college
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Again, much has been said about Lawrence, fundamental rights,
and the standard of review, and I do not wish in this Article to repeat
the excellent dialogue on the case that appears in the existing litera-
ture.  Nor is it necessary to do so here.  Rather, this Article accounts for
Lawrence in the following ways: (1) although Lawrence is a masterful judi-
cial work of mystery, it is fair to conclude that Lawrence is (though it
need not be) a relatively conservative opinion as to the criminal law of
sex generally;34 (2) nevertheless, to have meaning or importance as a
matter of constitutional law, Lawrence must protect something, and that is
a right of some kind for adults to engage in private, consensual, non-
prostitution sex that does not harm others or an institution that the
state may protect;35 and (3) consequently, Lawrence is perhaps less con-
servative, but still deeply ambiguous and ambivalent, as to the criminal
law of private, consensual, non-prostitution adult sex.
With this understanding of Lawrence, this Article therefore explores
this ambiguity as it relates to, and the extent to which Lawrence governs,
the criminalization of sexual conduct that cannot plainly be proscribed
pursuant to Lawrence’s Exclusions Paragraph: private, non-prostitution,
consensual sex between adults.  In doing so, this Article focuses upon
two distinct areas of sex crimes which demonstrate the potential effects
of Lawrence’s looseness and ambiguity.36  The first involves sex obtained
by fraud or seduction, where the adult parties both consented to engag-
ing in sexual activity, implicating the traditional criminal law distinction
between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement.  The second
involves criminal laws governing forbidden sexual partners, with special
attention given to the highly public matter of secondary school teacher-
student sexual relationships between consenting adults.  This Article
argues that the loose and ambiguous language in Lawrence could have
real implications for the criminal law of sex in America in these areas
and others, and that the Court should rectify this shortcoming by clari-
e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence’s Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the Doc-
trine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117 (2005).  I will refer to this body of
literature more fully in Part III.
34. On this, I concur substantially with the reading of Lawrence that Carpenter
expressed in his early article. See Carpenter, supra note 11, at 1167.
35. It is possible to add an additional limit on the definition of the right, protecting
it only when the sex occurs as part of an intimate relationship. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
567.  Calvin Massey has described it this way. See Massey, supra note 9, at 960–61.  But
more on this aspect of Lawrence, infra Part III.D.
36. To be clear, this Article does not oppose legislation criminalizing sex by fraud
or sex between teachers and adult students, and certainly does not advocate such con-
duct.  The point of this Article is to argue that, as it is written, Lawrence creates the poten-
tial for constitutional challenges to a wide range of sex crimes (though lower courts have
read Lawrence perhaps far more conservatively than it is written).  These two particular
areas—sex by fraud and sex between teachers and adult students—appropriately high-
light the problems created by Lawrence’s holding and have not been the subject of much
literature in the wake of Lawrence, despite the fact that these areas of sex crimes are often
highly-publicized and often the subject of reported cases, making them worthy topics for
scholarly discussion.  Moreover, this Article is focused upon the criminal law of consensual
sex after Lawrence, and does not fully engage the issues of administrative or civil sanctions
for consensual sexual conduct, though this Article acknowledges the possibility of (and
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fying the scope of the Lawrence right and its application in the world of
crimes involving private, consensual, and non-prostitution adult sex.
But even if Lawrence provides little additional constitutional protection
for consensual adult sex, Lawrence’s real virtue actually lies in the narra-
tive that it stimulates beyond constitutional rights—a political conversa-
tion about the over-criminalization and over-prosecution of sex in
America.
I. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SEX OBTAINED BY FRAUD OR SEDUCTION
The stories and lies that one will perpetuate to persuade another
into sex, range from the ridiculous to the bizarre and the truly detesta-
ble.37  But the criminal law must decide when such lies or misrepresen-
tations produce such significant social harms that they warrant moral
condemnation by the community.  As a California court phrased one
such problem when it reviewed a recent case, “[a] man enters the dark
bedroom of an unmarried woman after seeing her boyfriend leave late
at night and has sexual intercourse with the woman while pretending to
be the boyfriend.  Has the man committed rape?”38  No, the court
said—or, yes, but only if she is married, because California makes it
crime to have sex with a person where the actor deceives the victim into
37. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39
(1998) [hereinafter Falk, Rape by Fraud] (compiling cases from several categories of rape
by fraud).  Falk’s piece is extraordinarily comprehensive.  This Article does not seek to
taxonomize rape by fraud in such a comprehensive way.  Rather, it merely offers a synop-
sis of this category of sex crimes, where there is an issue as to the validity of consent, in
order to frame the Lawrence-related constitutional problem.  Accordingly, although Falk’s
article covers both rape by fraud and rape by coercion, this Article excludes criminal
prohibitions involving coercion, because those are clearly subject to the Exclusions Para-
graph of Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  For a truly comprehensive, if somewhat
dated, account of these sex crimes, I highly recommend Falk’s piece.
Jed Rubenfeld has penned a more recent, and provocative, account of the problem
created by deceptive sex, and its relation to Lawrence. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of
Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013).  Rubenfeld
argues that rape law ought to be based on a right of self-possession.  His piece has been
subjected to strong criticism. See generally Tom Dougherty, No Way Around Consent: A Reply
to Rubenfeld on “Rape-by-Deception,” 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 321 (2013); Deborah Turkheimer,
Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2013); Patricia J. Falk, Not Logic, But Experi-
ence: Drawing on Lessons from the Real World in Thinking About the Riddle of Rape-by-Fraud, 123
YALE L.J. ONLINE 353 (2013).
38. People v. Morales, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 921–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).  Julio
Morales was accused of entering Jane Doe’s bedroom after her boyfriend left and having
sex with her while she was asleep. Id. at 923.  He was convicted of rape of an unconscious
person. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4) (West 2008).
A somewhat similar factual scenario arose in Connecticut in 2009. Police officer
Jared Rohrig allegedly pretended to be his identical twin brother, Joe, in order to have
sex with Joe’s girlfriend.  During their sexual encounter, the girlfriend realized that Jared
was not Joe because Jared did not have the tattoo that Joe had on his backside. See Ryan
Smith, Twin Trouble: Ex-Cop Jared Rohrig Pleads Not Guilty to Posing as Brother for Sex, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 12, 2009, 8:18 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-5372039-
504083.html.  He pleaded no contest to unlawful restraint and criminal impersonation;
the State dropped the sexual assault charges. See Brian McCready, Ex-Orange cop avoids jail
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believing that the actor is her spouse.39  In 2010 in Israel, an Arab man,
who worked in Jerusalem, had a sexual encounter with an Israeli
woman who subsequently learned that he was not Jewish.40  He had
given her a name, “Dudu,” that is a common Israeli name, and the
woman never asked whether he was Jewish, nor did he tell her that he
was Arab.41  By all objective indications, according to one of the Israeli
judges, the sex itself was consensual, but the woman complained after-
ward, saying she would never have had sex with him had she known he
was not Jewish.42  As part of a plea bargain, he was convicted under
local law of rape by deception.43  May American criminal law punish
this conduct?
A. Traditional and Contemporary Approaches
The traditional rule in the law of rape was, as Joshua Dressler
appropriately describes it, that a seducer is not a rapist.44  The rule was
predicated upon the distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud
in the inducement.45  Pursuant to one popular description of the doc-
trine, if the victim was deceived as to the nature of the sex act itself—
that is, if the deception precluded her from knowing that she was con-
senting to sex—then the defendant could not escape liability by claim-
ing consent.46  This is fraud in the factum.  On the other hand, if the
victim knew that she was consenting to sex, and was deceived only as to
some fact ancillary to the nature of the act of having sex, then the
defendant could fairly claim that the victim consented and he could not
be guilty of rape.47  Fraud in the inducement, then, was akin to what
39. Morales, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 921–22, 929. The court’s conclusion was based on
the fact that it was unclear whether the jury convicted Morales based on the theory that
she was asleep (which would have been a valid theory) or on the theory that she was
unconscious as to the nature of the act (which was not valid on these facts).  Had the
victim been married, Morales could have been convicted under the section of the Penal
Code described above. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(5) (West 2008).
40. See Joe Adetunji & Harriet Sherwood, Arab guilty of rape after consensual sex with
Jew, THE GUARDIAN (July 20, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/21/
arab-guilty-rape-consensual-sex-jew.
41. See Harriet Sherwood, Saber Kashour: “My conviction for ‘rape by deception’ has
ruined my life,” THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
jul/25/saber-kushour-rape-deception-charge.
42. See Adetunji & Sherwood, supra note 40.
43. Id.  Subsequently, media reports described a more complicated case in which
the victim had complained of a forcible rape that was plea bargained to a reduced charge.
See Rachel Shabi, Arab rape-by-deception charge ‘was result of a plea bargain,’ THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 8, 2010, 1:09 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/08/rape-by-
deception-plea-israel.
44. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 594 (5th ed. 2009).
45. Id. See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 17.3(c) at 908 (5th ed. 2010)
(explaining the distinction in the rape law context); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 215 (3d ed. 1982) (stating “consent induced by fraud is as effective
as any other consent . . . if the deception related not to the thing done but merely to
some collateral matter”); Joel Feinberg, Victims’ Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured
Consent, 96 ETHICS 330, 331 (1986).  Rubenfeld is highly critical of the reasoning underly-
ing the distinction. See Rubenfeld, supra note 37, at 1398–1400.
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has been described by Susan Estrich as simply “old fashioned
seduction.”48
One of the most well-known cases on the factum-inducement dis-
tinction was the famed California case of Boro v. Superior Court.49  The
defendant Boro telephoned the victim, Ms. R., claiming to have blood
test results that suggested she suffered from a deadly disease that
resulted from the use of public toilets.50  Claiming to be “Dr. Stevens,”
he told her that there were only two ways to treat the disease: one was a
painful and expensive surgery, the other was to have sex with a man
who could serve as a donor of a serum that would cure the disease.51
The latter option would cost her only $4,500, but when he was
informed that she could not afford that option either, “Dr. Stevens”
told her that $1,000 would be a sufficient down payment.52  Ms. R.
could not afford the surgery, so she agreed to the sexual encounter,
and it was carried out in a hotel room with the anonymous donor
(Boro).53 Ms. R. said she believed she would die if she did not get the
“treatment.”54  Boro was charged with rape under California law but
the California Supreme Court ruled that this was fraud in the induce-
ment—and therefore not rape—because Ms. R. fully and willingly con-
sented to have sex with the unknown person, even though her reasons
for doing so were predicated upon a fraud.55
Particularly in light of the rape reform movement that desired
focus on the issue of consent, the factum-inducement distinction
seemed troubling.  After all, is all fraud in the inducement the same?
Should there be a legally cognizable difference between a perpetrator
claiming that he is a famous actor, on the one hand, and the perpetra-
tor assuring a woman that he does not have a sexually transmitted dis-
ease, where the woman says she will sleep with him but only if he does
not have an STD?56  Or, as Dressler and others have asked, would that
lead to some absurd results (for example, a man would be guilty of rape
if he told his girlfriend that he loved her, thus inducing her to have sex
with him, even though he later admits that he never loved her)?57  In a
48. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1120 (1986).
49. 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
50. Id. at 1226.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1227.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1230–31. Boro is discussed in Morales. See People v. Morales, 150 Cal. Rptr.
3d 920, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).  Distinguish the cases in which consent was said to exist
based on the factum-inducement dichotomy from those in which there is, for example,
therapeutic deception as in Boro. A conviction in the latter is improper because the state
cannot prove the force required for rape. See Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356, 357–58
(1872) (doctor induced fifteen-year-old girl to have sex with him by falsely telling her that
her father consented, that he treated all women with sex, and that the alternative was a
painful procedure that would probably result in her death).
56. See Vivian Berger, Not So Simple Rape, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 69, 76–77 (1988).
57. See DRESSLER, supra note 44, at 584; see also Berger, supra note 56, at 76–77 (ask-
ing whether a false “I love you” constitutes a material misrepresentation warranting liabil-





      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 73 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE104.txt unknown Seq: 11  1-MAY-14 14:39
2014] THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CONSENSUAL ADULT SEX AFTER LAWRENCE 135
comprehensive study of rape by deception and coercion, Patricia Falk
described the factum-inducement dichotomy as “problematic” because
it relies upon a formal legal distinction that fails to “critically examin[e]
the types of fraudulent inducements that impugn the voluntariness of
consent.”58 Perhaps the criminal law’s task, then, is to articulate some
meaningful distinctions among the types of fraud in the inducement,
imposing criminal sanctions upon frauds that work particular kinds of
personal and social harms.
Some scholars like Susan Estrich began asking for a criminal law
that sought to punish all sex obtained by deception.59  As Estrich popu-
larly framed the question, why is it that we make it a crime to obtain
someone’s property through fraud or deception, but we do not do the
same when the fraud or deception is used to obtain sex?60  She com-
pares the then-extant rape law to the law of false pretenses and theft by
deception, and ultimately concludes that loss of bodily integrity is a “dif-
ferent and greater injury than loss of money.”61  Estrich does not claim
that sex by fraud or deception ought to be treated and punished the
same as traditional forcible rape, but she plainly wishes it to be criminal-
ized.62  The factum-inducement distinction is inadequate.
Others, though, questioned criminalizing this kind of fraud
broadly.  Vivian Berger responded to Estrich’s paper, suggesting that
many men who engage in such deceptions are despicable characters,
but ought not to be called rapists.63  Unlike Estrich, who considers
fraudulent sex and extortionate sex together, Berger separates the two
and considers sex by extortion far more culpable.64  Berger says she has
“minimal sympathy for the idea that the law should protect, via criminal
sanctions, the cheated expectations of women who sought to sleep their
way to the top but discovered, too late, that they were dealing with swin-
dlers.”65  Similarly, Donald Dripps—advancing the idea of a sexual
expropriation offense that would capture certain conduct less serious
than rape in which pressure short of violence or violent threats is
exerted to obtain sex66—conceded the strength of Estrich’s argument,
but was also careful to distinguish extortionate sex from fraudulently
obtained sex.67  Moreover, he wrote, in light of the complexity of sexual
relationships and the difficulty of determining the causal relationship
between sex and a particular deceit, proposals to criminally punish
fraudulently obtained sex could result in the “sweeping criminalization
of sex.”68  Dripps preferred instead to focus the sexual expropriation
58. See Falk, Rape by Fraud, supra note 37, at 49–50.
59. See Estrich, supra note 48, at 1115–21.
60. Id. at 1119–21.
61. Id. at 1121.
62. Id. at 1120–21.
63. See Berger, supra note 56, at 76–77.
64. Id. at 77.
65. Id. at 76.
66. See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1799–1800 (1992).
67. Id. at 1802.
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offense on the issue of consent and the disregard of words in intimate
affairs, concluding that such conduct implicates interests in sexual
autonomy though not in freedom from violence.69
In modern criminal law, many states have taken seriously this schol-
arly debate and have adopted the notion that not all fraud in the
inducement is the same and that at least some forms of deception
should vitiate consent, even if the victim knew she was consenting to
sex.
Shortly after Boro, for example, California changed its rape law and
added a new provision, which now makes it a crime to induce a person
to engage in certain sex acts where the victim’s consent is procured by
false or fraudulent representation that “the sexual penetration served a
professional purpose when it served no professional purpose.”70  Other
states have also adopted sex-by-deception prohibitions that appear to
abolish the factum-inducement distinction, some more punitive than
others.  In Tennessee, for example, sexual battery is a Class E felony
and includes sexual penetration where the penetration is “accom-
plished by fraud.”71  This is perhaps the broadest of all state criminal
proscriptions of sex by deception.  In State v. Tizard, the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals expressly rejected the argument that fraud
only in the inducement would bar conviction under the statute.72  That
court held that Tennessee law gave “fraud” its broadest meaning and
that consent induced by deception is ineffective.73  Alabama also makes
it the crime of sexual misconduct for a male to engage in sexual con-
duct with a female where consent “was obtained by the use of any fraud
or artifice.”74  And Montana, for purposes of its sex crime provisions,
provides that a victim is incapable of consent due to “deception, coer-
cion, or surprise.”75  Beyond this broader category, many states have
made sex by deception a crime in specific instances, making it a crime
to deceive a person into believing that the perpetrator is the victim’s
spouse, or into believing that the person is a physician or other person
authorized to perform a medical procedure or any other professional
service.76
69. Id. at 1803.  Dripps writes that, “[t]he gist of the new offense, then, would be to
punish any one who purposely or knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person,
knowing that the other person has expressed a refusal to engage in that act.” Id. at 1804.
70. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4)(D) (West 2013).
71. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(3) (2010).
72. 897 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).  There, a physician who had been
treating a seventeen-year-old boy masturbated the boy, claiming that he was obtaining a
semen sample to test white blood cells.  Id. at 735–37.  The physician argued that the
victim was at all times aware that he was being masturbated and that he never objected; in
fact, the victim continued receiving treatment and steroid injections from the physician,
even after the initial masturbation. Id. at 740–41.
73. Id. at 741.
74. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (1975).
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2011).
76. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(D) (West 1872); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18-3-402(1)(c) (West 2001), (g); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-405.5 (1)(a)(II),
2(a)(II) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-71(a)(6), (7) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012);
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B. Special Problems: Misrepresented Identity and Seduction
Not all states have gone so far as to make all fraudulently obtained
sex a crime, continuing instead to recognize the traditional factum-
inducement distinction.  But that distinction is especially confounding
in the mistaken identity cases.  Does misrepresentation about being a
famous actor or athlete work the same harms as misrepresentation
about being a husband or fiancé?
In this sense, consider a different formulation of the factum-
inducement distinction.  As one court has stated it, in the case of a man
convicted of rape under military law after having intercourse with a
sleeping woman who had recently had intercourse with another man,
Clearly, fraud in the inducement includes such general knavery
as: “No, I’m not married”; “Of course I’ll respect you in the morn-
ing”; “we’ll get married as soon as . . .”; “I’ll pay you _____ dollars”;
and so on.  Whatever else such tactics amount to, they are not
rape.
The question is—what is fraud in the factum in the context of con-
sensual intercourse?  The better view is that the “factum” involves
both the nature of the act and some knowledge of the identity of
the participant.  Thus in the “doctor” cases, consent would not be
present unless the patient realized that the “procedure” being
employed was not medical, but sexual . . . . [W]e take it that even
the most uninhibited people ordinarily make some assessment of
a potential sex partner . . . before consenting to sexual inter-
course.  Thus, consent to the act is based on the identity of the
prospective partner.77
Notice how this formulation may well differ from the one
described previously.  Using the previous formulation, the person who
pretends to be a famous actor, athlete, or musician, or who feigns
employment as a talent scout78 or casting agent or famed fashion pho-
tographer,79 would be committing only fraud in the inducement, so
long as the person from whom he obtained sex knew that she was con-
senting to sex.  But using this latter formulation—if “factum” is predi-
cated upon either a belief that the act is something other than sex or a
belief that the actor is not who he says he is—the same person would
arguably be committing fraud in the factum, because he is deceiving
the victim as to his identity.  Consent, on this view, would be ineffective
even if the victim knew she was consenting to sex because her consent
Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud as a
Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 75 (2007).
77. United States v. Booker, 25 M.J. 114, 116 (C.M.A. 1987).  The court found that
Booker’s conduct was fraud in the factum. Id.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant con-
victed of wire fraud after creating scheme to have sex with women whom he said he would
assist in finding acting and modeling work).
79. See Falk, Rape by Fraud, supra note 37, at 69 (describing unpublished case of
Oscar Kendall, who impersonated a famous fashion photographer in order to induce
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would be based on the man’s assumed identity and, we can say, she
would not have consented but for that assumption.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Suliveres v. Common-
wealth continued to recognize the traditional factum-inducement dis-
tinction where the defendant had sex with a woman by impersonating
his brother, the woman’s boyfriend.80  The room was dark and the
woman assumed that the man was her boyfriend.81  The two then had
sex.82  The court said this was fraud in the inducement and prohibited
defendant’s prosecution for rape, recognizing that “[f]raudulently
obtaining consent to sexual intercourse does not constitute rape as
defined in our statute.”83  Contrast this with the same court’s decision
in Commonwealth v. Caracciola.84  There, the victim entered Caracciola’s
car after he instructed her to get off of the street where she was walk-
ing.85  She noticed that he was wearing a firearm.86  He made state-
ments implying that he was a police officer, such as when he said that if
the victim did not to stop crying, he would “lock [her] up for more
things than [he] was planning on.”87  After stopping in a nearby school
parking lot, the defendant began touching the victim’s legs.88  When
she said that she was afraid and that the police frequented the area, the
defendant assured her that he was a police officer.89  She had sexual
intercourse with him, fearing that she would be arrested if she did
not.90  Caracciola claimed this was not rape in Massachusetts because
the sex was merely induced by fraud, his lie that he was a police officer,
which presumably simply made the woman feel more comfortable
about having sex with him.91  The court disagreed.  Caracciola’s con-
duct and threats about incarcerating the victim, combined with his mis-
representations about being a police officer, were sufficient to
constitute constructive force, which was sufficient to satisfy the Com-
monwealth’s rape statute.92  These cases illustrate the more traditional
approach in which fraud will not substitute for force, but where force is
actually or constructively present, a rape conviction would be
appropriate.
Even more problematic are the mistaken identity cases that result
in adulterous sex—where the perpetrator fraudulently leads the victim
to believe that he is the victim’s spouse.  Courts have substantially dis-
agreed as to whether this is rape.93  One approach suggests that, regard-
80. 865 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. 2007).
81. Id. at 1088.
82. Id.  The victim said she was “not fully awake” at the time of the penetration. Id.
83. Id. at 1091.
84. 569 N.E.2d 774 (Mass. 1991).






91. Id. at 777.
92. Id. at 778.
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less of the nature of the misrepresentation and the nature of the
resulting sex, the sex is nonetheless consensual, and thus fraudulently
pretending to be the victim’s spouse is merely fraud in the induce-
ment.94  Other courts, however, suggest that this amounts to rape—as
fraud in the factum—because the consent given is to the act of marital
sex, not to adulterous sex, and the resulting adulterous sex is more
harmful.95  This latter view is consistent with the latter formulation of
the factum-inducement distinction mentioned above: even though the
victim knew she was consenting to sex, the perpetrator is still guilty of
rape because he worked a deception as to the nature of the act, but that
deception is based upon her mistake as to his identity.  Consequently,
the mistaken identity cases depend not simply upon whether the juris-
diction recognizes the factum-inducement distinction, but also upon
which variation or understanding of that distinction applies.
Finally, a small group of states today have statutes that separately
criminalize seduction.  At one point, gender-specific seduction crimes
were pervasive in the United States.96  At common law, seduction was
merely a tort.97  Yet by the early twentieth century (prior to the admis-
sion of Alaska and Hawaii) thirty-seven states had enacted criminal
seduction statutes.98  One of the early seduction laws was actually a fore-
runner of the current teacher-student sex bans: Ohio in 1886 enacted a
law that prevented a man over age twenty-one who was a superinten-
dent, tutor, or teacher from having sexual intercourse with any female
under his instruction, even where the sex was consensual.99  The law
“conclusively presumed that the tutor was a vile seducer, the pupil an
innocent victim.”100  By the early twentieth century, in most seduction
jurisdictions the law had evolved and seduction required a false or pre-
tended promise of marriage.101  In other states, seduction typically
barred the seduction and debauchery of a woman of chaste or virtuous
character.102  Notably, though, these statutes were “broad enough to
94. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54 (1857) (holding no rape occurred where slave
entered bed of a white woman and had sex with her, as she thought Lewis was her hus-
band). See also LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 908 (explaining various approaches).
95. See Regina v. Dee, 15 Cox C.C. 579 (1884). See also Ann Coughlin, Sex and Guilt,
84 VA. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that fraud should negate consent where victim believed
she was having sex with husband). Cf. Feinberg, supra note 45, at 345 (explaining that
misrepresentation that induces adulterous sex results in more serious harm than other
types of misrepresentations of identity, the difference between “suffering an evil and miss-
ing a good”). See also Rubenfeld, supra note 37, at 1397 (describing impersonation of a
woman’s husband as one of only two generally-recognized exceptions to the general rule
that deception is not rape).
96. See H.W. Humble, Seduction As a Crime, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 144 (1921).
97. Id. at 154. See also Brian Donovan, Gender Inequality and Criminal Seduction: Prose-
cuting Sexual Coercion in the Early-Twentieth Century, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 61, 65–66
(2005) (stating that seduction existed as a tort since the colonial era); Lea Vandervelde,
The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817, 867 (1996) (discussion of seduction in
tort); Larsen, supra note 1, at 379 (discussion of history of seduction in tort).
98. Humble, supra note 96, at 144.
99. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 219.
100. Id.
101. Humble, supra note 96, at 145–50.
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cover practically every case of intercourse with consent,”103 as seduction
was understood to encompass “‘the use of arts, persuasions, or wiles to
overcome the resistance of the female who is not disposed, of her voli-
tion, to step aside from the path of virtue. . . . Any seductive arts or
promises, where the female involuntarily or reluctantly yields thereto,
are sufficient.’”104
Interestingly, then, conduct that might well exculpate a man from
the crime of rape because it is merely fraud in the inducement could
actually subject him to criminal liability pursuant to a seduction statute,
if the woman fit the statutory character requirement.  This may seem
inconsistent with the idea that a person should be free of criminal
responsibility where the woman knowingly consents to sexual inter-
course, which is the defining element of fraud in the inducement doc-
trine.  But seduction laws were predicated upon a different concern:
that a chaste or virtuous woman would not have consented to the sex,
but for the enticements of the seducer.105  Not unlike rape law, as well
as criminal prohibitions on adultery, the preservation of female virtue,
it turns out, has been identified as the core concern of seduction legis-
lation.106  The ruination of a female was taken so seriously that not only
was it the object of criminal legislation, it also gave rise to what Law-
rence Friedman has described as the “unwritten law” that justified the
use of force or violence (often deadly) by a man in defense of his wife’s,
daughter’s, mother’s, or sister’s personal honor.107  Still, others have
suggested that, despite the modern view of criminal seduction as a
product of a paternalistic and sexually repressive bygone era, those laws
were actually important tools for combating sexual violence and coer-
cion and “acted as an instrument of social justice for vulnerable work-
ing-class and immigrant women.”108
Later in the twentieth century, many states abandoned their seduc-
tion laws as part of a growing trend of “anti-heart-balm” statutes
designed to account for more active female sexuality.109  Still, today, a
few seduction statutes remain notable.  In Mississippi, it is seduction
(punishable by up to five years) to obtain carnal knowledge of any
woman of previous chaste character by virtue of a feigned or pretended
marriage or a false promise to marry.110  Oklahoma has a similar seduc-
tion statute that makes it a crime to have sex with a woman under false
promise to marry.111  Michigan has the broadest seduction prohibition
that does not require a false promise of marriage: it is a felony punisha-
ble by up to five years for a man simply to seduce and debauch an
unmarried woman.112
103. Id. at 146.
104. Id. (quoting State v. O’Hare, 36 Wash. 516, 518 (1904)).
105. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 218–20.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 221–22.
108. Donovan, supra note 97, at 83.
109. See id. at 82; Larsen, supra note 1, at 393-97.
110. MISS. CODE § 97-29-55.
111. 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1120 (West 2002).





      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 76 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE104.txt unknown Seq: 17  1-MAY-14 14:39
2014] THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CONSENSUAL ADULT SEX AFTER LAWRENCE 141
Most states, then, punish some form of fraudulent sex or sex by
inducement or enticement.  The traditional factum-inducement distinc-
tion has broken down, both in the law of rape and in the law of other
sex crimes.  What we see in modern criminal law, then, is a realization
of Falk’s observation that the question is not whether to criminalize sex
by deception, but rather what kinds of deception will suffice for criminal
liability.113  And yet in some jurisdictions, most any deception will suf-
fice.  This trend is evidence of an American criminal law in which the
pendulum has swung toward making non-consent the essential defining
element of modern rape, where some categories of fraud that do not
deceive as to the nature of the act may be said to vitiate what would
otherwise be consent in fact to sex.
C. Lawrence and the Sex by Fraud or Seduction Crimes
If Lawrence protects a right to engage in private, consensual, adult
sexual activity, then, the argument might run, Lawrence could possibly
provide a very narrow avenue of protection for a defendant accused of a
seduction or sexual deception crime where the sex was in fact consen-
sual.  Although the case law does not appear to address any situations
post-Lawrence in which a defendant has been accused of a seduction or
sex-by-deception crime and has made such an argument relying on
Lawrence, there remains a tiny category of prosecutions in which such
an argument would at least be plausible, but it would almost certainly
have to involve a seduction statute like the one in Michigan—a rare
statute that is seldom enforced.  Rape by fraud likely contains a suffi-
cient element of exploitation (and in some cases, much more than this)
to at least justify state regulation in the abstract and would fall outside
of Lawrence’s protection.
The problem, for a criminal defendant, is this: if the state defines
consent as being vitiated by fraud (even where fraud was in the induce-
ment), then the sex is by definition nonconsensual and is thus outside
the zone of Lawrence’s protection.  If the state retains a factum-induce-
ment distinction and the fraud is merely in the inducement, then state
criminal law cannot reach the defendant in the first place and the pro-
tection of Lawrence is unnecessary.  Consequently, in the former situa-
tion, the defendant would have to argue that Lawrence constitutionalizes
the factum-inducement distinction and forbids state law from defining
something as nonconsensual where the common law would not have
vitiated consent.  This is likely asking far too much of the Court and of
Lawrence.  Of the crimes implicated in this Part, then, the best candi-
dates for attack pursuant to Lawrence are the seduction crimes, where
applied to seductive sex between adults.
Of course, rape obviously falls outside of any constitutional protec-
tion.  But for a challenger, the relevant question is which understand-
ing of rape we mean when we say this.  Is it possible, one might ask, that
113. See Falk, Rape by Fraud, supra note 37, at 167. See also Falk, Not Logic, But Experi-
ence, supra note 37, at 368–69 (observing that criminal laws applicable to fraudulent sex
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Justice Kennedy was sufficiently aware of the factum-inducement dis-
tinction in rape law that his opinion sought to ensure constitutional
protection for that distinction, or that he did so unwittingly?  The predi-
cate to the right recognized in Lawrence, as Cass Sunstein has observed,
is consent.114  If Lawrence functions only pursuant to the traditional fac-
tum-inducement distinction, then situations where fraud in the factum
exists would be unprotected by Lawrence because fraud in the factum
vitiates the consent given.  But because fraud in the inducement does
not vitiate consent, then it could be argued that sex obtained by fraud
in the inducement is at least presumptively protected under the
umbrella of Lawrence, even if state law does not follow that legal distinc-
tion.  That would need to be a very large umbrella, however, because it
assumes that the Court meant to constitutionalize the factum-induce-
ment distinction—and there is virtually no evidence from Lawrence that
this is the case.  Indeed, Lawrence says “coerc[ion]” and “injur[y]”
explicitly, though it does not mention fraud or deception.115  Perhaps
this was meant to be Justice Kennedy’s way of simply reinforcing the
obvious point that rape would not be included in any constitutional
protections, and that “coercion” only means sex obtained by force or
threat.  But if coercion is understood to mean sex obtained by fraud or
deception—a fair understanding116—then it is fair to conclude that all
fraudulent sex falls outside of Lawrence’s small universe of protection.
Sexual deception as coercion makes sense, especially if we adopt a
deeper, and broader, understanding of harm.  Coercion involving a
threat places the victim in a position where she cannot reasonably will a
choice to refuse consent.  With sexual deception, she can still choose
not to have sex, but the decision to do so is not made on the basis of
accurate information, and the deceiver is culpable for the misinforma-
tion.  Consequently, the consent given may fairly be said to be unknow-
ing, even unintelligent.  In this sense, the victim of the fraud is deprived
of her autonomy and bodily integrity, just as a person who engaged in
sex via force or threat.  As Jane Larsen has written, “deception into sex
is not as physically injurious as rape by force; yet like a rape, sexual
fraud falls on the wrong side of the consent line.”117
So if (as is likely) Lawrence does not constitutionalize the factum-
inducement distinction, political actors therefore retain the latitude to
define what conduct vitiates consent.  In Tennessee criminal law, for
example, all fraud negates consent.118  Tennessee could not enforce
such a rule if Lawrence constitutionalized the factum-inducement
dichotomy.  And of course, it seems on its face difficult to suggest that
the Constitution would forbid the states from defining sex crimes in a
114. See Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1064 (2004).
115. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
116. See LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 909 (placing rape-by-fraud cases in category of
“coercion”).
117. See Larsen, supra note 1, at 414.  Larsen is speaking in the context of tort
actions, but her conclusions about the harm done and the relationship of fraud and con-
sent seem to apply equally in the area of criminalization.
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way that ensures protection from certain harms the state can reasonably
identify.  Of course, complicated questions arise if we merely defer to
the state’s judgment that certain sexual situations cannot, by definition,
be consensual.
Merely saying that states should be able to define consent, while
likely true, is not unproblematic.  One could plausibly argue that such a
rule would allow states to dictate the scope of a federal constitutional
right, and it could undermine some truly consensual sexual relation-
ships that the constitutional law might otherwise wish to foster or at
least grudgingly protect.  Consent, on this reading, has no independent
constitutional meaning.  It is solely a creature of state law, and thus the
scope of the Lawrence right is dependent upon the content of state law.
Furthermore, to say that consent ought to have some constitutional
dimension when it is part of a standard for determining the scope of a
constitutional right is not inconsistent with the Court’s work in other
areas of criminal case adjudication.  In the constitutional criminal pro-
cedure context, for example, the Court has been willing to define con-
sent for purposes of determining the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection.119  But of course, Lawrence did not do this, and it is fair to
assume that when Lawrence speaks of “consensual” sex, it means “con-
sensual” as defined by the relevant state criminal law.  Moreover, in
other contexts the Court has recognized a constitutional right and
allowed the states the latitude to determine whether the right is impli-
cated based on definitions the state creates.120  In short, had the Court
meant to give constitutional dimension to “consent” in Lawrence it could
have explicitly done so, even going so far as to say that the right to
private, non-prostitution, consensual adult sex is informed by the legal
tradition of the factum-inducement dichotomy.  But Lawrence did no
such thing.
None of this is to say that all sex by fraud or deception ought to be
criminalized, but rather that the state would have a rational basis,
beyond mere moral disapproval, for concluding that the conduct is wor-
thy of condemnation, thus leaving the conduct outside the scope of
constitutional (as opposed to legislative) protection.  Here, then, Jus-
tice Kennedy may have been a bit sloppy. Lawrence could, and should,
have more explicitly identified the kinds of harmful conduct in relation
to sex that remain unprotected.  Even if we can say that the sex was
“consensual” as that term is understood in the context of the factum-
inducement distinction, sex obtained by deception still has the ring of,
if not the actual taint of, exploitation.  For this reason, the more con-
119. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that
consent to search is valid when it is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances).
120. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (allowing states to define
mental retardation for purposes of determining who can be executed). Atkins held that
the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of a person who is mentally retarded.  The
Court, however, explicitly left to the states the task of determining who falls into the
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servative reading of Lawrence would likely forbid constitutional
protection.
Lawrence might be fatal, however, to seduction as a crime, at least as
it is enforced in the Michigan statute, which makes it a felony punisha-
ble by five years in prison for a man to “seduce and debauch” an unmar-
ried woman.121  Because seduction can include “arts, persuasions, or
wiles,”122 and not necessarily deception as it is practiced in the fraud
cases or even in the breach of promise to marry statutes, some acts of
seduction—understood broadly—may not implicate an interest against
sexual violence nor involve the same kind of autonomy interest or inter-
est against exploitation that exists with respect to the sexual fraud
crimes.  Rather, one commonly accepted reading of the history of
seduction suggests that it was primarily designed to promote a purely
moral interest: preserving womanly virtue (and in the case of the Michi-
gan statute, the virtue of an unmarried woman in particular).123  Even
on the more judicially conservative reading of Lawrence described here,
Lawrence might arguably view this as precisely the kind of moral interest
that does not deserve vindication.  Consequently, if sex between adults
is obtained by seduction, is otherwise consensual in fact, is private and
not prostitution, and did not involve deception of a kind that would
implicate the state’s interest in protecting the victim against exploita-
tion or coercion, a defendant accused of seduction could plausibly
claim the protection of Lawrence and at least force the state to defend
the application of the statute on grounds other than preserving female
virtue (and the more recent literature on seduction suggests the state
may have such additional justifications, given appropriate facts).124
This is hardly enough to make Lawrence meaningfully more libertarian
in practice, however, because of the rarity of such statutes and the even
greater rarity of seduction prosecutions involving the factual situation
described here.  Nevertheless, to the extent that statutes like the one in
Michigan are used by prosecutors as the basis for either a criminal trial
or for negotiating a plea,125 prosecutors should be aware at least of the
vulnerability of seduction crimes after Lawrence.
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.532 (1970).
122. See Humble, supra note 96, at 146 (quoting State v. O’Hare, 36 Wash. 516, 518
(1904)).
123. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 217–20.
124. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 97, at 71-82 (discussing nineteenth century
seduction cases and comparing them to modern “date rape” scenarios); Larsen, supra
note 1, at 403 (arguing that sexual fraud should be an actionable tort).  In light of the
justifications given by those like Larsen, it is at least conceivable that some of those same
justifications—beyond sexual morality—could validate criminal statutes on seduction.
This is also true if we view seduction as a form of sexual exploitation (such as with rape-by-
fraud generally), which I view as outside of any due process protections. See Falk, Not
Logic, but Experience, supra note 37, at 357–59.
125. For an interesting comment on this, see Eugene Volokh, Recent Michigan Prose-
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II. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CONSENSUAL SEX BETWEEN SPECIFIC
CATEGORIES OF ADULTS
Lawrence makes clear that sex between people of the same gender
is not subject to criminal proscription, at least where it is private, con-
sensual, and non-prostitution, and where the proscription is justified
only on grounds of preserving public morals.126  But other categories of
sexual partners potentially implicate concerns beyond simply public
morality, even when the sex is private, (apparently) consensual, and
between adults.  Criminal law forbids sexual conduct between, for
example, persons whose sexual contact would be incestuous;127
between psychotherapists and their patients (even former patients);128
and between members of the clergy and persons who are seeking spiri-
tual aid, comfort, or therapy from them.129  But perhaps the most pub-
licly prominent category of forbidden sexual partners is that of teacher
and student.  Instances of teacher-student sex are now regularly covered
by the mass media, most often where the student is in secondary
school.130  And—not unlike many other things in life that drive politi-
cal action—as more and more instances of teacher-student sex invade
the public’s consciousness, the more likely politicians are to respond
with legislation, including criminal legislation.  But even the desirable
notion of protecting young people from sexual exploitation by those
with supervisory or other authority over them could have constitutional
limits.  This Part explores some cases in which those limits have been,
or could be, tested, in light of Lawrence.
A. Representative Post-Lawrence Cases of Sex Between Teachers and
Adult Students
Brittni Colleps was recently sentenced by a Texas court to five years
in prison for engaging in consensual sex with other adults in the privacy
of her home.  The legal problem for Colleps: she was a public school
teacher, and the adults with whom she had sex were students enrolled
at her school.  Colleps was an English teacher at Kennedale High
126. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 578 (2003).
127. See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005).
128. See State v. Hollenbeck, 53 A.3d 591 (N.H. 2012).  Admittedly, this area of sex
crimes is worthy of additional academic and judicial attention, in light of Lawrence.
129. See State v. Dutton, 450 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
130. For an interesting and useful gallery and synopsis of highly-publicized student-
teacher sex scandals, see Notorious teacher sex scandals, CBSNEWS.COM, http://www.cbsnews.
com/pictures/notorious-teacher-sex-scandals/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).  These include,
as just a few examples, the cases of Mary Kay Latourneau, a Seattle teacher who began a
sexual relationship with a male student when he was twelve years old and whom she even-
tually married and had children with; Debra LaFave, a Florida teacher who had sex with a
14-year-old student; Pamela Rogers Turner, a Tennessee teacher who was convicted after
having sex with a 13-year-old student; Amber Jennings, a Massachusetts teacher who was
accused of having sex with, and sending nude photos to, a 16-year-old student, and who
eventually pleaded guilty on the nude photo charges; and most recently, Sarah Jones, a
former Kentucky teacher and Cincinnati Bengals cheerleader who had a sexual relation-
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School in north Texas.131  Over the course of two months at her private
home, Colleps had sex with five Kennedale High students, including
group sex with as many as four students.132  One student received oral
sex from Colleps but did not have intercourse with her.133  One
encounter was captured on a cell phone video recorded by one of the
students, though it did not show Colleps’s face.134  All of the students
were at least eighteen years old and thus fully capable of consenting to
sex under Texas law.135  Yet Colleps was charged under a Texas crimi-
nal statute that forbids improper relationships between an educator
and student, a second degree felony.136  In August 2012, a jury con-
victed Colleps on all sixteen counts of the crime.137
Of course, Colleps’s case differs in significant respects from many
of the teacher-student sex cases that have become so red hot in media
coverage.  First, several facts distinguish Colleps in ways that make her
unsympathetic: she engaged in group sex, which might suggest that the
sex was not related to an expression of love or in furtherance of a com-
mitted relationship; the sex was captured on video; and she exchanged
sexually explicit text messages with the students.  On the other hand,
rather than having sex with students properly characterized as “chil-
dren” or “minors,” Colleps had sex only with students who were adults.
Indeed, prosecutors could not charge Colleps with statutory rape, leav-
ing them with the “improper relationship” statute as their criminal law
refuge against her.  While a broader reading of Lawrence might appear
to supply Colleps with some basis for challenging the application of the
improper relationship statute here, the relevant cases have not read
Lawrence so liberally.
First, consider how Texas courts have treated their own statute.  In
Ex Parte Morales, a male “Student Activities/Recreation Assistant” at a
private Baptist school was convicted, pursuant to the improper sexual
relationship statute, for having sex with a male student at the school,
who was over the legal age of consent.138  Morales claimed a fundamen-
tal right to “adult consensual sexual activity” and lodged a facial attack
on the statute’s constitutionality, citing Lawrence.139  The Texas Court
131. See Deanna Boyd, More Students Tell of Sexual Escapades With Former Kennedale




134. Id. Colleps was recently the subject of a feature on ABC’s news program 20/20.
In the interview, Colleps suggests that she was victimized because she never gave her con-
sent for the students to shoot the video. See Jim Dubreuil, Teacher Who Had Group Sex With
Students Says She’s the Victim, ABC NEWS (Sept. 28, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/
brittni-colleps-texas-teacher-group-sex-students-shes/story?id=17338821#.UOcyI6zTzoM.
135. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(c)(1) (West 2009).
136. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.12(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012).
137. See Deanna Boyd, Ex-Kennedale Teacher Guilty of Sex With Students; Mom Asks Jury
For “Mercy,” FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.star-tele-
gram.com/2012/08/17/4189321/ex-kennedale-teacher-guilty-of.html?storylink=digger-
topic.
138. 212 S.W.3d 483, 486–87 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
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of Appeals upheld the statute.  According to the court, Lawrence did not
establish a fundamental right and thus only rational basis review
applied.140
The court had little difficulty concluding that the state had multi-
ple rational bases for the law, despite Morales’s contention that the law
was so broad as to be not rationally related to a legitimate state interest
in punishing predatory or coercive sex.141  First, the state has a rational
interest in preventing the exploitation of “schoolchildren” and in con-
cluding that students might not easily be able to refuse consent where
the sexual partner is an educator, taking the conduct outside of Law-
rence’s protection.142  The court emphasized that Morales’s challenge
was a facial one, not an as-applied one, and thus the statute would
unquestionably be constitutional in situations involving minor stu-
dents.143  In any event, it did not matter that the student in this case was
legally an adult because the legislature could have rationally concluded
that those “clothed with the imprimatur of school employment . . . will
possess the sort of power disparities enabling them to coerce or unduly
influence students to engage in sexual conduct.”144  The statute also
advances the rational goal of preserving trust and confidence in the
school system by prohibiting sex between a student and those whose
employment gives them access to students “as a conduit for sex.”145
And finally, the State has a rational basis, consistent with the tenets of
the Texas Constitution regarding public education, in having an educa-
tional environment conducive to learning.146  That goal could be
undermined if school employees could have sex with students.147  In
short, teachers are not similarly situated to the kinds of private actors
who were prosecuted in Lawrence.148  They occupy positions of public
trust in an educational setting populated by young people and, as a
result, it is reasonable for the State to constrain their sexual activities
when the object of their sexual desires is a student, someone they teach
or supervise.149
140. Id. at 491–93.
141. Id. at 495.
142. Id. at 495–96.  I emphasize in quotations that court’s reference (which appears
repeatedly in the opinion) to protecting Texas “schoolchildren.”  The reference suggests
that the court was primarily concerned about the law’s legitimate application to minors;
otherwise, because the victim in this case was an adult, the description would seem both
inappropriate and misplaced as a way of describing this victim.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 496.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 496–97 (citing TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1, which provides that “a general
diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of
the people,” and that the state legislature has a duty “to establish and make suitable provi-
sion for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.”).
147. Id. at 497–98.
148. Id. at 497.
149. Id. The court of appeals was asked to reconsider the soundness of Morales in
Berkovsky v. State, 209 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006), and rejected the defendant’s
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State v. Clinkenbeard150 involved a similar improper relationship
statute in Washington.  There, Clinkenbeard, a bus driver who was sixty-
two years old at the time of his conviction, formed a relationship with a
twelve-year-old girl who rode Clinkenbeard’s bus.151  The relationship
continued to develop as the girl aged, but does not appear to have been
sexual.152  She took music lessons from him when she was in the ninth
grade and they had frequent phone conversations.153  When the girl
turned eighteen, Clinkenbeard divorced his wife, moved his trailer next
to the girl’s home, and then had sex on multiple occasions with the
girl.154  Although she had already turned eighteen when they first had
sex, she was still enrolled in the school district.155  The jury acquitted
Clinkenbeard on multiple counts of child molestation but convicted
him under a statute that makes it a felony for a school employee to have
sexual intercourse with a student where the student is at least sixteen
but not more than twenty-one, and where there is more than a five-year
age difference between the student and employee.156  The statute does
not require authority over or supervision of the student.157  The Wash-
ington Court of Appeals upheld the statute against Clinkenbeard’s Law-
rence claim.  The court found—applying only rational basis review,
based on its conclusion that Lawrence “[did] not employ a fundamental
rights analysis”158—that the State had a legitimate interest in protecting
children from sexual exploitation, particularly in the educational envi-
ronment.159  Here, although there was no evidence that Clinkenbeard
and the girl ever had sex prior to her turning eighteen, their personal
relationship began when she was twelve, thus raising the concern that
Clinkenbeard’s school employment-based access to the girl offered him
an opportunity to “groom or coerce” her into having sex.160  It was
therefore reasonable for the State here to apply this statute, the pur-
pose of which is to protect children from those who would use their
access to sexually exploit them.161
150. 123 P.3d 872 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
151. Id. at 875–76.





156. Id.  Curiously, the statute defines the crime as sexual misconduct with a minor.
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.093(1)(b) (West 2009) (defining sexual misconduct
with a minor in the first degree as a class C felony).  Yet the statute applies to actors who
have sex with students who are legally adults, as in this case.
157. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d at 876.
158. Id. at 878.  Interestingly, when considering Clinkenbeard’s equal protection
challenge, the court recognized that Lawrence “did make clear that this area of autonomy
is of great importance,” and “cautions strongly against the states interfering in private
relationships.” Id. at 880.  The court was suggesting that perhaps an argument for inter-
mediate scrutiny could be successfully made.
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Most recently, the Kansas Court of Appeals rejected a Lawrence-
based challenge to that state’s unlawful sexual relations statute in State
v. Edwards.162  There, a thirty-year-old choir instructor at a Wichita area
high school had consensual sex with an eighteen-year-old student of
his.163  The Kansas statute made it a crime for “a teacher or a person in
a position of authority” to engage in consensual sex, lewd fondling or
touching, or sodomy with a student enrolled at the offender’s
school.164  “Teacher” is defined broadly to include any professional
employee at the school (kindergarten through the twelfth grade) and
the statute makes no distinctions based on age.165  In a somewhat con-
fusing opinion that applied two distinct standards of review (rational
basis and strict scrutiny), the court held that Lawrence did not make it
explicit whether it viewed this as a fundamental right and that the
State’s interests in this law were sufficient to protect it from constitu-
tional challenge.166
Repeatedly emphasizing the power disparity between teachers and
students, the court said that teachers “have constant access to students,
often in an unsupervised context.”167 Thus, teachers are in a unique
position to groom or coerce students into “exploitive or abusive con-
duct.”168  Also, a “sexually charged learning environment would con-
fuse, disturb, and distract students, thus undermining the quality of
education in Kansas.”169  The court further explained that Lawrence
does not protect this sexual activity because this is a relationship where
consent might not easily be refused: students are required by law to
attend the school, are a captive audience, and “very well may not have
the necessary level of maturity to remove themselves from a sexually
charged situation.”170  The court shifted its discussion of the standard
of review, holding that the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
162. 288 P.3d 494 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).
163. Id. at 496–97.  It was undisputed that the student transported herself to
Edwards’s home and gave him a condom to use, and that the student was a mother (a fact
that the State argued had no relevance). Id.
164. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3520(a)(8) (2007) (repealed 2011).
165. Id. § 3520(b)(9). The statute was actually amended to eliminate age distinc-
tions. Edwards, 288 P.3d at 503.
166. Edwards, 288 P.3d at 502.
167. Id.
168. Id.  See also State v. McKenzie-Adams, 915 A.2d 822 (Conn. 2007), overruled in
part on other grounds by State v. Payne, 34 A.3d 370 (Conn. 2012).  In McKenzie-Adams, the
Connecticut Supreme Court upheld that state’s statute prohibiting sex between a school
employee and student. Id. There, the court held that even if a fundamental right of
consensual sex existed it did not encompass sex in the context of an inherently coercive
relationship, like teacher and student. Id. at 836.  Beyond this, the facts of McKenzie-
Adams differ in significant respects from other cases—there, the defendant-teacher had
sexual relationships with two students who were not friendly with one another and then
deliberately created further dissension between them. Id. at 830–31.  Once the two girls
learned that each was having sex with the same teacher, they voluntarily reported the
teacher’s conduct. Id. at 831.  There was also evidence that the defendant attempted to
pressure the students into certain sex acts, although in other respects the sexual relation-
ships appear to have been consensual. Id. at 829–30.
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ling interest because it does not infringe upon “any sexual activity unre-
lated to the job of teachers and does not prevent teachers from having
sexual relationships with adults who are not students.”171  Finally, the
court rejected Edwards’s arguments that the statute fails strict scrutiny:
it did not matter if the statute was enacted only to appease a single
parent who was upset over a teacher-student relationship; it did not
matter that the same sexual relationship would have been lawful if
Edwards was a college professor; it did not matter that courts in Iowa
and Idaho had rejected civil liability for teacher-student sex.172
The Morales and Edwards opinions delve more thoroughly than
does Clinkenbeard into the legitimate interests of the state.  Yet in each
case the court focuses on the state’s effort to protect “children” and
substantially ignores the relevance of the fact that the sex occurred
between consenting adults, which would seem to matter on an as-
applied challenge.  Had the applicable standard of review been one
involving heightened scrutiny, these courts would likely have been
forced to more meaningfully confront the argument that the state’s
interests in protecting children from exploitation seem reduced
(though not eliminated) in significance when the student becomes an
adult and where there is no evidence of actual coercion or exploitation
in the case. Edwards, for example, identifies the risk of exploitation but
does not address whether the absence of actual exploitation ought to
matter to the application of the statute in a given case, preferring
instead to characterize the teacher-student relationship as inherently
coercive and as preventing meaningful opportunity to refuse consent.
The court there assumed in one paragraph that students generally may
fail to possess the necessary maturity to refuse consent, but in the next
paragraphs, the court occupied itself with the distinctions between the
maturity levels of sixteen-, seventeen-, and eighteen-year-olds, admitting
that eighteen-year-olds possess greater levels of maturity.173  The court
then failed to specifically grapple with the fact that the student in this
case was eighteen and thus presumably possessed the heightened
maturity that the court acknowledged.  If it is true that the maturity
level of an eighteen-year-old is generally adequate for voluntary sexual
decision-making as to its consent or its refusal—and even the Supreme
Court has decided a series of cases in recent years recognizing the dis-
tinctions between eighteen-year-olds and those below age eighteen for
purposes of enforcing criminal laws174—then a challenger may well ask
171. Id. at 503.
172. Id. at 503–04.
173. Id. at 502–03.
174. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005) (holding that Eighth
Amendment bars capital punishment upon offender who was younger than eighteen at
the time of the offense); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding same as to
imposition of life without parole for non-homicide offense); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2464 (2012) (holding that Eighth Amendment bars mandatory life without parole
for homicide offenders under age eighteen); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394,
2402–03 (2011) (holding that fact that criminal suspect is under age eighteen is relevant
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whether the statute is rationally related to the state’s interest in prevent-
ing exploitation when the student is at least eighteen.
Another problem for the Edwards court is this: if Kansas public pol-
icy had meant for the sexual maturity of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds
to be so easily distinguishable from that of eighteen-year-olds, and to
matter when applying the unlawful sexual relations statute, then Kansas
law could have accounted for this fact.  But it did not, as Kansas makes
sixteen the age of consent for voluntary sex, reflecting a legislative
determination that sixteen and seventeen-year-olds possess—as a matter
of law, rather than fact—sufficient capacity for voluntary and intelligent
sexual decision-making (including, presumably, the capacity to give or
refuse consent).175  Yet the court goes on to say that the age of the
student is less important that the mere fact of the teacher-student rela-
tionship,176 meaning, presumably, that the relationship is one involving
an inherently coercive power disparity.  It is therefore that fact, and not
the maturity level of student, that Edwards appears to deem most critical
in preserving the statute.
Moreover, particularly in the context of the Washington statute
challenged in Clinkenbeard, a defendant may plausibly argue that the
State’s asserted interest in protecting students from exploitation by
those with access to them in an educational environment seems difficult
to reconcile with the language of the Washington legislation.  If it is the
mere fact of the student’s status as a student (rather than as a minor)
and the employee’s status as a school employee (rather than as an inten-
tional coercer or exploiter) that implicates the relevant interest, then
that same interest would be implicated if a twenty-three-year-old school
employee had consensual sex with a nineteen-year-old student.  Yet the
State does not punish the employee in that situation.177  At a minimum,
Clinkenbeard could have raised this problem in asserting his equal pro-
tection challenge to the statute by claiming that the age provisions were
not rationally related to the state’s asserted interest.178
The recent case of Paschal v. State,179 however, demonstrates these
concerns about the significance of the fact of private consensual adult
sex, and casts a shadow over the cases that have refused to recognize a
Lawrence violation.  Paschal was a high school teacher in Arkansas who
had been dating an eighteen-year-old student for several months.180
The relationship included sex.181  Paschal’s actions (and he knew this,
because he expressed concern to the school principal that his career
and relationship with his children might be in jeopardy)182 constituted
175. KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3522(a) (2007).
176. Edwards, 288 P.3d at 503.
177. See WASH. REV. CODE 9A.44.093(1)(b) (2009 & Supp. 2012).
178. Note that a subsequent equal protection challenge to the statute was rejected
by the Washington Supreme Court, where the defendant claimed that the statute imper-
missibly discriminated between certain school employees. See State v. Hirschfelder, 242
P.3d 876 (Wash. 2010).
179. 388 S.W.3d 429 (Ark. 2012).
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second-degree sexual assault, which occurs when a teacher at a public
school engages in sexual contact with a student who is enrolled at the
teacher’s school and is under the age of twenty-one.183  The Arkansas
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional as applied to Pas-
chal.184  The State improperly framed the issue as one asking whether a
teacher has a fundamental right to have sex with a student enrolled at
his school.185  Instead, framing the issue at a broader level of generality,
the court said the relevant question was whether the statute invaded the
personal and fundamental right of an adult to engage in consensual,
non-prostitution, and private sexual conduct with another adult.186
In holding that such a right existed in Arkansas, the court
explained that this was not a case in which the teacher had intentionally
exploited the teacher-student relationship so as to create a mere con-
duit for sexual gratification of the teacher.187  By all indications, Pas-
chal and the student were in a committed relationship that involved
more than simply casual sex.  The court was careful to distinguish its
earlier decision in Talbert v. State, in which the court upheld the State’s
statute making it third-degree sexual assault for a clergyman to have sex
with a penitent.188  That statute requires that the member of the clergy
be in a position of trust or authority over the victim and use the position
to engage in the sexual activity.189  Because Talbert involved coercive
conduct and Paschal did not, the court found that Talbert did not con-
trol.190  Moreover, applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that
even if the state has an interest in protecting school students from the
sexual advances of teachers (which it does, the court said),191 the stat-
ute did not apply the least restrictive means for advancing that inter-
est.192  Rather, if a teacher (like the clergyman in Talbert) used his
position of trust or authority over a student in order to create a conduit
for sexual gratification, the teacher was punishable under the state law
forbidding mandated reporters in positions of trust or authority from
using the position to engage in sex.193
Still, it is unclear how much the court relied upon Lawrence.  The
better reading of Paschal is that the statute was unconstitutional because
Arkansas law recognizes such a fundamental right.  Although the court
cited Lawrence, its statement that “ ‘[T]he fundamental right to privacy
implicit in our law protects all private, consensual, noncommercial acts
of sexual intimacy between adults,’”194 was drawn from language used
183. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-125(a)(6) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
184. Paschal, 388 S.W.3d at 434–35.
185. Id. at 435.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 434.
188. See Talbert v. State, 239 S.W.3d 504, 510–11 (Ark. 2006).
189. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126(a)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
190. Paschal, 388 S.W.3d at 435.
191. Id. at 436–37.
192. Id. at 437.
193. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126(a)(1)(C)(2006 & Supp. 2011)).
194. Id. at 435 (quoting Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (Ark. 2002)) (empha-
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in Jegley v. Picado, an Arkansas case decided a year before Lawrence.195
That case appears to rest on state constitutional law grounds, rather
than a federal one.196  Still, Paschal explicitly relied on Lawrence and
federal substantive due process doctrine to support his claim,197 and
the dissenting justices seemed to acknowledge that the majority agreed
with Paschal’s Lawrence claim.198  But the majority opinion nevertheless
criticized one of the dissents in a footnote, wondering why that dissent
relied upon cases from other jurisdictions “to determine whether [the
Arkansas statute at issue] violates the fundamental right to privacy
found in the Arkansas Constitution.”199
Perhaps what Paschal best represents, then, is the reality that some
judges are prepared to recognize that a Lawrence-type right extends far
enough to permit consensual sexual encounters between a teacher or
other school employee and an adult student, at least where the encoun-
ter does not involve coercion or any intent to exploit a position of
authority over the student.  Thus if Paschal’s reasoning is correct, we
cannot simply assume exploitation from the mere fact of the teacher-
student relationship.  The state would bear the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt not simply that a teacher and adult student
had sex, but that the teacher sought to use the position of authority as a
way of merely obtaining sex.  In the typical case, and in the absence of
objective evidence showing threats, coercion, or an intent to exploit the
power disparity in the relationship, this will be a difficult burden to
meet.  Still, though, the dominant approach has been to read Lawrence
in a judicially conservative manner and to offer wide deference to legis-
latures in asserting potential harms and risks that would affect not just
the student, but the system of public education more generally.
B. Lawrence and Teacher-Student Sex Crimes
As with the sex by fraud crimes, there are natural reasons to think
that Lawrence’s Exclusions Paragraph would cover the teacher-student
sex cases and validate the existing criminal sanctions.  After all, Lawrence
states that the right would not apply where the sexual conduct would do
damage to an institution that the state may protect or where the sex
occurs under circumstances in which consent might not easily be
refused.200  And the cases that have denied protection to the teacher
pursuant to Lawrence—and even Paschal, where the teacher was consti-
tutionally protected—have amply explained the relevant state interests:
protecting students from sexual exploitation, protecting the integrity of
holding. See State v. Edwards, 288 P.3d 494, 503 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).  Among the rea-
sons, the Edwards court said, was that Paschal found a fundamental right in the Arkansas
Constitution, and that Kansas had not recognized a corresponding state constitutional
right. Id.
195. See Jegley, 80 S.W.3d at 332.
196. Id. at 350.
197. Paschal, 388 S.W.3d at 435.
198. Id. at 442–43 (Baker, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 436 n.7 (emphasis added).
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the academic environment, and preserving a school system free of the
complications created by sexual relationships between employees and
students.201  If a Lawrence claim mandates only rationality, these inter-
ests would almost surely be adequate to survive review.  But even if pro-
tecting students from sexual exploitation demands the coercive force of
the criminal law, other interests, while worthy of protection, could be
served by administrative or civil remedies short of criminalization—
license revocation, for example; or termination, reprimand, or suspen-
sion from the school.
So if evidence existed that the teacher actually employed his posi-
tion of power or authority in order to obtain the sex, this would surely
fall outside of Lawrence’s protection, even if the criminal statute at issue
did not specifically make this an element of the crime.  But the central
question is whether the “power disparity” or the mere status as a teacher
or other authority figure in a particular school necessarily implies undue
influence over a student, or precludes the student from making sexual
choices knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.202
On one level, this power disparity claim might seem difficult to
limit.  After all, many sexual relationships involving power disparities
are not criminalized: a CEO who has consensual sex with her adminis-
trative assistant, an elected official who has consensual sex with her
intern, a wealthy man who has consensual sex with a poor woman.  Of
course, the state may pick and choose the power disparities it wishes to
target, but if the state is serious about power disparity as the reason why
sex inside such a relationship is inherently coercive or exploitative, then
the failure to criminalize sex occurring in other types of relationships
with power disparities could at least weaken the state’s claim.  Another
problem with the power-disparity-as-inherent-coercion claim is that it
could fail to account for the realities of a given relationship.  For exam-
ple, the teacher who says to student X, “I will fail you and prevent your
graduation from this school if you do not have sex with me,” would be
situated no differently—for Lawrence purposes—than the teacher who
says to student X, “If you sleep with me, I will give you an ‘A’ in my
course.”203  The latter scenario might be construed as an offer rather
than a threat, but in each case, the teacher is using his or her position
as a teacher to solicit sex from the student.  And in each case, it can
fairly be said that the student could not easily refuse consent.  These are
precisely the kinds of coercive tactics that would serve as evidence that a
faculty member is exploiting a power disparity, or status as a teacher or
school official, in order to obtain sex with the student.
201. See State v. Edwards, 288 P.3d 494, 502–03 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).
202. See Falk, Not Logic, But Experience, supra note 37, at 366 (arguing that sex within
authority-based relationships fall within the domain of rape-by-coercion, because “the
inherent power imbalance in these situations so gravely affects the victim’s ability to give
meaningful consent that it violates sexual autonomy.”).
203. The Dressler text uses this hypothetical, and I use it when I teach the material.
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 469 (5th ed. 2010).  For an
example of the latter scenario, see State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Mont. 1990)
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But a defendant raising a Lawrence-based challenge could argue
that these scenarios seem far different from a scenario in which a
teacher and an adult student develop genuinely close and romantic
feelings for one another, get to know one another, and subsequently
have sexual relations; this situation, the defendant could argue on the
appropriate facts, is especially different if the teacher has no direct
authority over the student. Lawrence’s Exclusions Paragraph, applied in
the adult teacher-adult student sex context, certainly would validate a
state interest in preventing sexual exploitation.  But when we consider
some cases, like Paschal, or even Edwards, we see that courts must con-
front the question of whether adult student-teacher relationships are
inherently exploitative or whether a situation exists where the element
of actual exploitation could, at least arguably, be lacking.  So a defen-
dant could ask: must the state prove exploitation, or is it enough to
simply presume it?
For example, one might imagine a defendant (on specific facts, of
course) claiming that the arguments about exploitation—protecting
students from power disparities or, in Lawrence’s language, from situa-
tions where they might not easily be able to refuse consent—may not
apply with the same force where the adult student (though this is likely
very rare) seeks out the teacher for sex.  Consider, again, the Colleps
prosecution.  There, at least one of the students involved with Colleps
testified that once he found out that Colleps had sex with one of his
friends, he urged the friend to “hook him up” with Colleps.204  That
the subsequent sex was exploitative on the part of Colleps seems a
somewhat weaker claim, unless, again, we are prepared to say that the
mere fact that she is a teacher transforms an otherwise consensual situa-
tion into an exploitative one.  Moreover, none of the students in the
Colleps case testified that they felt threatened, or harmed, or exploited,
nor did any of the students have a desire to see Colleps punished.205
Of course, even if a student independently desires and seeks out sex
with a teacher, this does not necessarily negate the risk of exploitation.
On the other hand, it is important to remember that once the student
reaches the age of consent to have sex, the student enjoys important
privacy rights related to his or her own sexuality.206  The state is now
implicitly granting the person sexual freedom that did not exist in the
same ways before the person became an adult.  So the adult student’s
own sexual autonomy—not simply the teacher’s—is implicated by the
teacher-student sex prohibitions.  Is it possible that we over oversimplify
(even misapprehend) the complicated nature of sexual and romantic
204. See Deanna Boyd, Jury sees video of former Kennedale teacher having sex with students,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.star-telegram.com/2012/08/
14/4181766/jury-sees-video-of-former-kennedale.html.
205. See Crimesider Staff, Brittni Colleps Case: Students who were alleged sex partners of ex-
Texas teacher say they do not feel like victims, CBS NEWS (Aug. 16, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57494881-504083/brittni-colleps-case-students-who-
were-alleged-sex-partners-of-ex-texas-teacher-say-they-do-not-feel-like-victims/.
206. Indeed, presumably, this is a corollary of Lawrence. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
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relationships generally, if we by law equate all sex involving relation-
ships in which power disparities exist, or  argue that all such situations
are equally exploitative?  Such an equation also, in some cases at least,
could diminish the sexual autonomy of the adult who is not at the top of
the power structure, whom the state has now otherwise empowered to
make his or her own sexual choices (and, as a consequence, to live with
the kinds of mistakes with which other adults must live when making
sexual choices).  Of course, it is once again worth noting that this argu-
ment would pertain only in situations where exploitation is presumed
merely by the nature of the relationship, but is not otherwise actually
present or intended on the part of the authoritative actor.  In cases
involving actual exploitation, or where the teacher acted with an intent
to exploit or to otherwise take advantage of his or her position of
authority in order to obtain sex from the student, the state’s interests in
criminalizing the conduct clearly become stronger, and Lawrence likely
offers no protection in the first place.207  Indeed, those may well be the
overwhelming majority of cases.
The body of literature addressing sexual relationships between
faculty and students at the college and university level is especially
instructive.  As one might imagine, much of that literature contends
that policies (not criminal laws, however) forbidding such relationships
are both necessary and desirable, in part because of the risks associated
with the practice and in part because of many of the same reasons that
we see articulated in the cases concerning such relationships at the sec-
ondary school level.208  One of the chief arguments is that such rela-
tionships are inherently coercive, which would place them outside of
Lawrence’s narrow zone of protection.209  But other scholars have
argued against the validity of general bans on faculty-student sex,210
207. Lawrence, of course, does not explicitly use this terminology, but I interpret
Lawrence’s reference to coercion and to injury. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (categorically
excluding sexual exploitation of this kind).
208. See, e.g., Neal Hutchens, Note, The Legal Effect of College and University Policies
Prohibiting Romantic Relationships Between Students and Professors, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 411, 438
(2003); Richard R. Carlson, Romantic Relationships Between Professors and Their Students:
Morality, Ethics and Law, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 505–06 (2001); Caroline Forell, What’s
Wrong with Faculty-Student Sex? The Law School Context, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 61 (1997);
Margaret H. Mack, Regulating Sexual Relationships Between Faculty and Students, 6 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 79, 94–97 (1999); Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and Legal Control of
Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988). But cf. Sunstein, supra note 114, at 1064
(questioning whether such policies are constitutional after Lawrence, where the parties
agree that the relationship is consensual).
209. See Mack, supra note 208, at 92–95.
210. See generally JANE GALLOP, FEMINIST ACCUSED OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1997);
Gary E. Elliott, Consensual Relationships and the Constitution: A Case of Liberty Denied, 6 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 47 (1999); Sherry Young, Getting to Yes: The Case Against Banning Consensual
Relationships in Higher Education, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 269 (1996); Secunda, supra note
33, at 156–62. See also Sunstein, supra note 114, at 1064 (arguing that, on an as-applied-
challenge where the parties both claim the relationship is consensual, “these cases would
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and Paul Secunda has offered a comprehensive, post-Lawrence response
to the arguments in favor of prohibitive policies.211
Beginning with the premise that Lawrence advances a sexual auton-
omy rationale beyond one limited to sodomy between people of the
same sex, Secunda (like others) sees a Millian devotion to autonomy
that would protect faculty-student sexual relationships.212  He responds
to the “consent might not easily be refused” argument for such policies
by concluding that faculty-student sexual relationships can be truly con-
sensual, just as private same-sex sexual relations can be.213  He further
responds to the argument about power disparities by concluding that,
although colleges and universities can look to individual instances to
determine whether the faculty member exploited the power differen-
tial, a blanket prohibition assumes such exploitation and denies the
parties an opportunity for “mutually satisfying” relationships—he is
clearly opposed to the notion of faculty-student sex as inherently
exploitative.214  Secunda further argues that colleges and universities
are not meant to come within the meaning of Justice Kennedy’s state-
ment about preventing “abuse of an institution the law protects;”215
rather, that phrase is likely referring to marriage.216  Secunda ulti-
mately prefers a sliding scale approach to college and university poli-
cies, in which the most weight would be given to policies that forbid
sexual relationships where there is a supervisory role for the faculty
member.217  This would place the burden on the faculty member to
show that her interests in the relationship outweigh the state’s inter-
ests.218  At the same time, the Constitution would presumptively favor
nonsupervisory relationships.219
Secunda is, of course, focused on internal college and university
policies that ultimately provide civil or administrative sanctions, rather
than criminal laws targeting secondary school teachers who could serve
time in prison for engaging in consensual sexual relationships with stu-
dents.  The question is whether the arguments he makes apply with any
of the same force in the latter context.  Perhaps, as the Edwards court
thoughtfully explained, secondary schools are different.220  The state
could reasonably argue, or rationally conclude, that good academic
order and academic integrity have special meaning in the secondary
school context, particularly where student assessment is typically not
anonymous (as it is in some higher education environments, like law
schools).  Or perhaps the state could rationally conclude that because
211. See Secunda, supra note 33, at 147–62. See also Paul M. Secunda, Getting to the
Nexus of the Matter: A Sliding Scale Approach to Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Policies
in Higher Education, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (2004) (discussing similar subject matter).
212. Secunda, supra note 33, at 118-19.
213. Id. at 147.
214. Id. at 147–48.
215. Id. at 148–50 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
216. Secunda, supra note 33, at 148–49.
217. Id. at 156–57.
218. Id. at 157–60.
219. Id. at 160–62.
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secondary school students are overwhelmingly below or have barely
reached the age of majority, and most of whom are required by law to
attend, they are more impressionable, more likely to be adversely
affected by an environment in which teacher-student sex is permitted,
and perhaps even more likely to be sexually exploited if a sexually per-
missive atmosphere is allowed to exist between teachers and stu-
dents.221  Or the state could argue that, although an atmosphere of
sexual freedom and permissiveness is to be expected to some extent
once one reaches college, such expectations do not apply (at least not
to the same degree) among secondary schools.
The concern, then, is not merely with the possibility of exploita-
tion, but with the dangers of sexualizing a learning environment, partic-
ularly one inhabited largely by minors.  The point here is simply that if
Secunda’s thoughtful arguments are ultimately persuasive in the con-
text in which he raises them—that is, if he is right about Lawrence’s
meaning and reach with respect to consensual sexual relationships in
higher education—then the criminal laws described here would have to
be predicated upon interests unique to the secondary school context.
That is at least a plausible predicate, but one that requires articulation.
C. Lawrence and the Importance of an Intimate Relationship
It is also important to note the language in Lawrence, which has not
escaped thoughtful scholarly attention,222 that the right is (or might
be) predicated upon the existence of an intimate relationship or upon
conduct designed to promote emotional intimacy between people.
Lawrence specifically describes the sodomy at issue in that case as “but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”223  As other
scholars have noted, this language at least suggests that sexuality is
worth preserving as a constitutional value only when it forms a part of
the development and preservation of intimate relationships that the
actors hope will endure.224  In this sense, and in light of the Exclusions
Paragraph, there is further evidence that while Lawrence may not look at
first blush as traditionally conservative with respect to law and sexuality,
neither is Lawrence particularly libertarian.  As such, Lawrence would for-
bid even consensual sex obtained by deception or seduction, because in
such cases the sexual intimacy is consummated not for the purpose of
developing a deeper emotionally intimate relationship, but merely to
serve the prurient interests of the seducer, who is engaging in fraud or
misrepresentation solely to obtain sex rather than to promote intimacy
within a committed relationship.  But in the adult teacher-adult student
cases, it would also require us to treat different teachers differently in
the cases discussed here.  It would, for example, treat David Paschal—
who dated his student lover prior to their sexual activity and by all indi-
221. Id.
222. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Inti-
macy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809 (2010).
223. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
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cations developed a serious relationship with her over time—differently
from Brittni Colleps, who engaged only in casual sex, including group
sex, with multiple student partners.
Yet if this reading of Lawrence is accurate (and it certainly is plausi-
ble), then fully, truly consensual “one-night stands” would not be pro-
tected under Lawrence’s privacy right.  Casual sex of all kinds, including
group sex (consider, again, Colleps’s case), would be unprotected even
if consensual.  This seems a strange result if Lawrence is otherwise seri-
ous about the way it describes the importance of sexual autonomy.
More broadly, Laura Rosenbury and Jennifer Rothman have written an
exceptionally thoughtful piece that acknowledges Lawrence’s conserva-
tive approach to sex and challenges this type of constraint on Lawrence’s
privacy right, arguing that sex can have value even in non-intimate or
enduring relationships.225  The authors describe the existing “sex-nega-
tive landscape” as discouraging sex outside of emotionally intimate rela-
tionships and as deterring “openness about the potential diversity of
sexual experiences.”226  As a result, sexual expression is considered
acceptable only in narrow circumstances, and any sex that falls outside
of those narrow categories is stigmatized.227  According to their formu-
lation, sexual association and intimate association must not be con-
flated.228  If the Rosenbury/Rothman formulation is the better reading
of Lawrence, or if some subsequent case adopts this formulation, then
clearly the possibility of a seducer claiming a constitutional bar to his
prosecution becomes somewhat more palatable, but again, only to the
extent that the seductive activity is not also fraudulent or otherwise
exploitative.  The same is true with the teacher who has consensual,
casual, or group sex with adult students, outside the context of a com-
mitted relationship.  And yet, if the Lawrence right really does depend
upon the existence of an intimate relationship, then those persons situ-
ated in otherwise prohibited sexual relationships would arguably pos-
sess a stronger case for protection under Lawrence where the sex was a
part of a deeper and more lasting relationship (which is to say, it
involves more than merely casual sex).  In the case of teacher-student
sex, the argument for deliberate exploitation at least seems stronger if
the sex is isolated and casual, unconnected to a deeper commitment
between the two parties.  By contrast, exploitation appears less likely as
an explanation for the teacher’s conduct if objective evidence of such
relational commitment exists.
Making these kinds of distinctions, of course, simply reinforces the
argument that Rosenbury and Rothman advance: valuing consensual
sexual intimacy between adults means recognizing its value outside of
committed relationships, and this means moving to a vision of sexual
intimacy that more fully considers sex in the context of freedom, self-
225. Id. at 811.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 812.
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fulfillment, and self-realization.229  Yet it is those very distinctions that
could indicate the difference between a teacher-student sexual relation-
ship that actually implicates state concerns about sexual exploitation,
and one that does not.
III. RETHINKING SEX CRIMES AFTER LAWRENCE
The two areas of sex crimes discussed here may seem somewhat
detached on the surface.  The sex-by-fraud materials focus primarily on
the issue of whether consent can be said to exist; that is, whether the
deception or misrepresentation vitiates consent.  In the teacher-student
materials, the cases focus on the nature of such relationships—whether
we presume non-consent because the relationships are inherently coer-
cive and thus cannot be legally consensual—and upon the state’s inter-
ests in forbidding sex based solely upon identities and roles of the
sexual partners.  Both areas raise the problem of actual or potential
sexual exploitation.  Moreover, both areas raise the same potential con-
stitutional problem: whether, if the sex at issue is private, non-prostitu-
tion, truly consensual, and between adults, the state may choose to
nonetheless make the sex a crime without violating due process.  And
yet, at a deeper level of criminal lawmaking, both areas compel us to
confront the question of what types, and degrees, of harm are sufficient
to implicate the interests and functions of the criminal sanction:
whether the conduct at issue is sufficiently worthy of condemnation and
punishment imposed by the political community.  The politics of crime-
definition and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion become espe-
cially valuable components of the criminal law narrative that Lawrence
sets in motion.
Consequently, perhaps the better understanding of Lawrence, from
the perspective of criminal law, is not one that focuses upon the funda-
mentality of the right, the standard of review, or even the nature of
constitutional protection for sexuality, important as those considera-
tions are.  Rather, perhaps Lawrence is better understood as a case that
compels us to consider more carefully which consensual sexual conduct
we decide to punish.  Strader’s analysis of Lawrence rightly highlights
not only Lawrence’s significance as a criminal law precedent but also
Lawrence’s interest in harm.230  As the state’s justification is more closely
scrutinized, naturally, the burden is greater on the state to identify the
substantiality of the harm that it seeks to prevent and punish.  But even
at the level of rational basis review, the harm that the state identifies
must be more than an abstract harm to public morality.  Same-sex sod-
omy simpliciter, then, cannot be criminalized because it causes no harm
to individuals and no social harm that the state is otherwise entitled to
229. See id. at 819–21 (citing with approval, inter alia, J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G.
Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563,
611–13, 615 (1977) and David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957
passim (1979)).
230. See Strader, supra note 24, at 51–61.  On this aspect of Lawrence, then, Strader
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address through the criminal sanction.  Indeed, the categories of sexual
conduct that fit within the Exclusions Paragraph all include sexual con-
duct that could be deemed sufficiently harmful to the political commu-
nity, beyond harms that may be characterized as moral ones only.  But
those categories of conduct, and the ones discussed in this Article, chal-
lenge us to properly identify the scope of any harm principle
announced in Lawrence—whether, as Strader argues, that harm must be
proven to exist in each case, or whether the state is free to identify
potential harms or risks of exploitation even if not actually present.
Understood this way, then, Lawrence emerges as an instrument for pro-
pelling a larger narrative about the overcriminalization, or at least the
overprosecution, of sex.
Maybe this is the real virtue of Lawrence.  Even if Lawrence is read to
apply only rational basis review, thus setting a low bar of justification for
most sex crimes (and thus likely validating all, or at least the over-
whelming majority of, sex-by-deception crimes and those involving pro-
hibited sexual relationships beyond mere same-sex ones), and even if
Lawrence’s constitutional holding only reinforces many restraints on—
rather than the increased liberation of—sex,231 it nonetheless forces us
to grapple politically with whether we simply make crimes out of, and
prosecute, too many consensual sex acts. Lawrence’s concerns, then,
tend to merge with those of the criminal law.
The literature on overcriminalization in America is substantial,232
but it is not clear that sex crimes have played a significant role in the
debate (beyond the subject of prostitution).233  Perhaps this is a prod-
uct of our inability to achieve greater sexual liberation, leaving us mired
in a kind of sexual conservatism that regards much sexual activity as
socially unacceptable, unseemly, or morally questionable—even if pri-
vate and consensual, particularly outside of marriage.  Or perhaps it is
because, like other areas of criminalization, legislators can afford to
broaden criminal prohibitions without fear of a political downside and
because no constituency for decriminalization exists that is politically
worthy of defending.234  In the context of private, non-prostitution, and
consensual sex, however, this explanation for criminalization does not
seem to apply—unlike other forms of criminal activity, private, consen-
231. See Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 222, at 810.
232. I have summarized this extensive literature elsewhere. See J. Richard
Broughton, Congressional Inquiry and the Federal Criminal Law, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 457, 466
(2012).
233. The literature of decriminalizing prostitution is sizeable.  For just a few exam-
ples, see Belkys Garcia, Note, Reimagining the Right to Commercial Sex: The Impact of Law-
rence v. Texas on Prostitution Statutes, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 161 (2005); Michael Conant,
Federalism, the Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize Prostitution, 5 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 99 (1996); Margaret A. Baldwin, A Date with Justice: Prostitution and the
Decriminalization Debate, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 125 (1994); David A.J. Richards, Commer-
cial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1979).
234. See Broughton, supra note 232, at 471.  I am influenced by Bill Stuntz’s work on
the politics of criminalization, and he makes a similar point with great persuasiveness. See
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sual, non-prostitution sex outside of marriage is common enough that
every American legislator has a relevant constituency engaging in this
behavior.
Moreover, the “tough on crime” label that normally drives the
politics of crime-definition seems difficult to apply when one is talking
about consensual sex between adults.  Still, perhaps those crimes actu-
ally involve an interest worth punishing through the criminal sanction.
As Falk notes, for example, one of the emerging themes in the sex by
fraud cases is that the perpetrators tend to commit their frauds upon
multiple victims, thus raising legitimate state concerns about sexual pre-
dation as well as exploitation.235  And as we see in the student-teacher
cases, if the state must seek an external harm to justify what otherwise
may be truly consensual sex, the externality is not simply the risk of
sexual exploitation but also the educational institution or system itself
and the learning environment and good order that it must promote to
be effective at the critical but complicated task of educating young peo-
ple.  Sexualization of the learning environment thus raises legitimate
public concerns beyond the risk of exploitation.  The larger criminal
law-making point here, then, is that criminal law could actually be
drawn to reflect these legitimate state interests by including the relevant
harm as an element of the crime, thus allowing us to meaningfully dis-
tinguish the most harmful sex from sex that, is unworthy of social con-
demnation and public punishment through criminal sanction.236  The
fact that we ought to criminalize some consensual sex does not mean
that we should criminalize most of it.  Nor does it preclude us from
using other, civil or administrative mechanisms—rather than the force
of criminal law—to protect legitimate public interests.  But even as we
seek to protect those interests, defining criminal law in this area
requires recognizing that, very often, romantic and sexual relationships
are complicated and cannot easily be placed into neat categories that
presume them to be socially harmful.
Indeed, at a time when the substantive criminal law has grown by
alarming proportions, and has invested prosecutors with enormous
power,237 the moment is ripe for more fully considering how the sub-
stantive criminal law of sex is contributing to the rightful scope and
power of the state.  In such massive—and massively powerful—criminal
law and prosecutorial regimes, it is a mistake to unthinkingly perpetu-
ate a regime of criminalized consensual, private, adult sex without ade-
quately considering whether public resources ought to be devoted to
prosecuting such cases and to subjecting offenders to public punish-
235. See Falk, Rape by Fraud, supra note 37, at 50–51.
236. I understand Strader to make a similar, but slightly different, point in the con-
text of judging the constitutionality of sex crime statutes.  For Strader, if the text of the
statute fails to clearly identify the relevant harm being targeted, then the government
must affirmatively prove that the act caused specific harm to person or property (but not
“harm to society”). See Strader, supra note 24, at 74–76.  A mere assertion of an abstract
harm will not do.
237. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
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ment in the absence of actual harms, particularly where civil and
administrative remedies might be available and more desirable.  So
even if the state can identify non-morality interests that would survive
constitutional scrutiny, it is fair to ask whether those are interests that
the state can protect without using the blunt force of the criminal law
and criminal prosecution.  To say that Paschal, Colleps, Edwards, or
Morales have done something to compromise the educational environ-
ment—and that they should be disciplined—is one thing.  To expend
scarce public resources on their prosecutions and then to imprison
them is quite another.  To say that psychoptherapists cannot have sex
with their patients is one thing; to say they cannot do so even after
termination of the professional relationship is quite another; to prose-
cute and put them in jail for it is still another.238
So regardless of whether Lawrence reaches as far as this Article has
(rather skeptically) suggested that it might (or, to put it more precisely,
that it could be argued to reach), American policymakers cannot simply
rely on an ambivalent Supreme Court to determine the scope of per-
missible consensual adult sexuality.  Consequently, we ought to under-
stand Lawrence as a case that challenges existing political assumptions
about the criminal law of sex.  It compels us to bring crimes involving
truly consensual, private adult sex to the table as we further the conver-
sation about the proper scope of the American criminal sanction and
exercise of prosecutorial power and discretion.  Even if we assume that
Lawrence is more conservative than libertarian,239 and even if one
wishes that Lawrence was clearer about the scope of its protection of
consensual, non-prostitution, and private adult sex, a conservative
grounding for a leaner and more sensible criminal law of sex remains
possible.  The result (though not the methodology) in Lawrence is not
inconsistent with a thoughtful form of conservatism that embraces pru-
dent limits on the criminal sanction and the power of the state.  While
conservatism embraces restraints on sexual practices that inflict identifi-
able social harms, it does not require criminal punishments for any and
all conduct that may be socially undesirable.  The criminal law is a vital,
but not exclusive, instrument for achieving a tolerable social order.
For the thoughtful conservative—who may be skeptical of this
assessment of Lawrence’s virtue—Justice Thomas’s two-paragraph dis-
sent in Lawrence is worth careful consideration.  When Justice Thomas
channels Justice Stewart in Griswold,240 calling this an “‘uncommonly
silly law’” and saying that he would vote to repeal the Texas sodomy
statute if he were a member of the Texas legislature,241 Justice Thomas
is demonstrating a substantive criminal law vision not so attenuated
from that of the Lawrence majority, even if his constitutional analysis
differs significantly.242  “Punishing someone for expressing his sexual
238. See State v. Hollenbeck, 53 A.3d 591, 598–99 (N.H. 2012).
239. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 11.
240. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
241. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J. dissenting)).
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preference through non-prostitution consensual conduct with another
adult,” Thomas says, “does not appear to be a worthy way to expend
valuable law enforcement resources.”243
The prudent political decisionmaker knows that she must pick her
battles, wisely, with serious consideration given to the proper equilib-
rium between good social order and freedom, to reasonable limits on
the power of the state, and to an appreciation of social custom and
tradition as well as a recognition that those customs and traditions
evolve.  In this sense, the overcriminalization concern and the aims of
conservatism are entirely compatible, even in the arena of sex crimes.
CONCLUSION
For ten years, the criminal law has endured the ambiguities of Law-
rence. Those ambiguities create especially complicated constitutional
questions about criminal sexual behavior in factually consensual sexual
encounters.  It is important to emphasize again that this Article does
not condone, endorse, or justify any of the sexual activity or conduct at
issue in the cases or hypotheticals discussed here.  What this Article has
attempted to do, however, is to identify a framework for considering the
enticingly rich but deeply unclear holding in Lawrence and to discern
whether Lawrence offers some admittedly narrow protection for truly
factually consensual (that is, consensual as to the nature of the act),
non-prostitution sexual encounters between adults that the state never-
theless forbids through the criminal law.  The existing understanding of
Lawrence among lower courts, if accurate, suggests that Lawrence is a
comparatively conservative opinion that likely offers little in the way of
restraints on the state’s ability to regulate sex.  That may well be an
accurate interpretation of Lawrence, but it is no substitute for clarity.  In
truth, the loose language in Lawrence has real implications for the crimi-
nal law of sex in America and for the sexual behavior of consenting
adults.  The Court should rectify this shortcoming.  But even if it does
not, Lawrence has provided American criminal justice policymakers and
prosecutors with an opportunity to engage the broader problem of
overcriminalization in the area of sexuality and to target only that sex-
ual conduct which is sufficiently personally or socially harmful to justify
the coercive power of the criminal sanction.  When it comes to truly
consensual sex between adults, there is a universe of conduct that
should be criminalized and prosecuted, but it is likely a small one.
243. Id. at 605. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
